Analysis of traffic signals on a software-defined network for detection and classification of a man-in-the-middle attack by D’Orsaneo, Julian N.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
DSpace Repository
Theses and Dissertations 1. Thesis and Dissertation Collection, all items
2017-09
Analysis of traffic signals on a
software-defined network for detection and
classification of a man-in-the-middle attack
DOrsaneo, Julian N.
Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/56120
This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United
States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the
United States.














Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. 
ANALYSIS OF TRAFFIC SIGNALS ON A  
SOFTWARE-DEFINED NETWORK FOR DETECTION 









Thesis Co-Advisors:  Murali Tummala 
  John C. McEachen 
Second Reader: Bryan Martin 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 i 
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB  
No. 0704-0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing 
instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection 
of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including 
suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 
Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork 
Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington, DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY 
(Leave blank) 
2. REPORT DATE   
September 2017 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE   
ANALYSIS OF TRAFFIC SIGNALS ON A SOFTWARE-DEFINED 
NETWORK FOR DETECTION AND CLASSIFICATION OF A MAN-IN-
THE-MIDDLE ATTACK 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
 
6. AUTHOR(S)  Julian N. D’Orsaneo 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING 
ORGANIZATION REPORT 
NUMBER     
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND 
ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING / 
MONITORING  AGENCY 
REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the 
official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. IRB number ____N/A____. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT   
Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
 
     Software-defined networking (SDN) has the potential to revolutionize the management capabilities of a 
highly distributed military communications environment. Yet, military adoption of SDN is contingent on a 
thorough analysis of security implications. In this thesis, we investigate a man-in-the-middle (MITM) 
attack that exploits the centralized topological view critical to SDN operations. In particular, we present a 
new scheme for detection and classification of the attack at the network layer. We apply wavelet analysis 
to detect anomalous conditions introduced by the MITM attack at traffic signals collected at network 
switch ports. Furthermore, we identify unique characteristics of reported anomalies in the collected traffic 
signals to build a classification framework. Other cyber events, such as a distributed denial-of-service 
attack and network congestion, are presented to the detection scheme to validate its general applicability. 
Overall, we successfully demonstrate the capability to detect and classify the MITM attack in addition to 
other cyber events at the network layer, thereby contributing to the security of SDN. 
14. SUBJECT TERMS  
software-defined networking, network monitoring, wavelet analysis, anomaly detection, man-
in-the-middle attack, anomaly classification   
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
105 

















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)  
 Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 
 ii 




Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. 
 
 
ANALYSIS OF TRAFFIC SIGNALS ON A  
SOFTWARE-DEFINED NETWORK FOR DETECTION AND 
CLASSIFICATION OF A MAN-IN-THE-MIDDLE ATTACK 
 
 
Julian N. D’Orsaneo 
Captain, United States Marine Corps 
B.S., Villanova University, 2011 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 























R. Clark Robertson 
Chair, Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering 
 iv 




Software-defined networking (SDN) has the potential to revolutionize the 
management capabilities of a highly distributed military communications environment. 
Yet, military adoption of SDN is contingent on a thorough analysis of security 
implications. In this thesis, we investigate a man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack that 
exploits the centralized topological view critical to SDN operations. In particular, we 
present a new scheme for detection and classification of the attack at the network layer. 
We apply wavelet analysis to detect anomalous conditions introduced by the MITM 
attack at traffic signals collected at network switch ports. Furthermore, we identify 
unique characteristics of reported anomalies in the collected traffic signals to build a 
classification framework. Other cyber events, such as a distributed denial-of-service 
attack and network congestion, are presented to the detection scheme to validate its 
general applicability. Overall, we successfully demonstrate the capability to detect and 
classify the MITM attack in addition to other cyber events at the network layer, thereby 
contributing to the security of SDN.  
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Software-defined networking (SDN) brings increased adaptability, visibility, and 
local security to network operations through the separation of the control and data planes 
[1], [2]. The benefits offered by SDN align with the requirements of geographically 
distributed tactical networks employed in military environments. The employment of 
SDN within the framework of the military communications environment has the potential 
to alleviate the burden placed on tactically focused ground combat forces for network 
management [1]. With SDN, a geographically distributed network is able to be managed 
from a centralized location, away from the dangers of the battlefield.  
The United States Marine Corps has sought to remove the complexities 
surrounding the establishment of tactical network environments through the introduction 
of the deployable site transport boundary (DSTB) [3]. The DSTB system is a 
preconfigured, deployable suite of servers and routers that enable connection to the 
Marine Corps’ primary network. In reality, it does not represent a plug and play solution 
as intended. In contrast, SDN provides a true plug and play solution for the deployed 
network environment due to its capabilities to change network configurations from a 
central location with software [1], [2]. While centralized network management through 
the adoption of SDN produces desirable military benefits, it also introduces critical 
vulnerabilities [1], [2], [4].  
A. BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION 
In addition to common network vulnerabilities, vulnerabilities associated with 
centralized network management have been consistently emphasized as a primary area of 
concern in SDN deployments [1], [2], [4]. Hong et al[4]. exploit the critical 
vulnerabilities introduced by centralized management in SDN to launch a man-in-the-
middle (MITM) attack. SDN manages the network based on a centralized view of the 
network topology [4]. The success of their MITM attack relies on the manipulation of the 
centralized topology view by relaying Link Layer Discovery Protocol (LLDP) packets 
between attacking hosts [4].  
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The motivation of this thesis is to contribute to the hardening of the SDN 
environment through detection and classification of cyber events, such as the MITM 
attack designed by Hong et al[4].. SDN vulnerabilities introduced and exploited by Hong 
et al. compromise the integrity of the SDN topology view [4]. Such security risks need to 
be mitigated in order to pave the way for military adoption of SDN.  
B. OBJECTIVE 
The solution presented by Hong et al. to detect their proposed MITM attack 
focuses on fingerprinting network hosts at the SDN’s central management location based 
on traffic at the application layer [4]. LLDP packets received from ports associated with 
fingerprinted network hosts reveal the attackers. Hong et al. acknowledge the need to 
analyze physical layer characteristics in order to detect the attack in the event the 
attackers try to hide. The attackers will be able to hide from their detection scheme if they 
prevent the generation of application layer traffic at the compromised attack hosts [4]. 
Hong et al. ignored this scenario in their work. In this thesis, we consider the attackers’ 
capabilities to hide and attempt to make it more challenging for them to do so. While it is 
tedious to analyze traffic signals at the physical layer due to the requirement of physical 
network taps [4], [5], it is fairly straightforward to obtain and analyze traffic signals at the 
network layer using software based network management solutions.  
The primary objective of this thesis is to present an alternative detection scheme 
at the network layer for the SDN MITM attack proposed by [4] in order to limit the 
abilities of the attackers to mask their attack. The secondary objectives are to classify the 
MITM attack based on the reported outputs of the detection scheme and generalize the 
capabilities of the detection scheme to detect other well-known cyber events. Our 
proposed solution relies on previous research presented by [6]–[8] in which wavelet 
analysis of traffic signals is used to expose anomalous network conditions. By collecting 
traffic signals at the network layer, we intend to extend the application of wavelet 
analysis to expose the anomalous conditions introduced by the MITM attack and 
determine if the identified anomalies are discernable from those introduced by other 
cyber events.  
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In addition to the SDN MITM attack, the cyber events used for validation of the 
detection scheme include a distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack and network 
congestion. The cyber events are emulated in a physical SDN environment and collected 
traffic signals associated with each event are analyzed by the detection scheme. The 
detection scheme is implemented in MATLAB.  
C. RELATED WORK 
The security solution implemented in [4] for the detection and prevention of the 
SDN MITM attack focused on monitoring application layer traffic to fingerprint hosts on 
the network. The relaying of LLDP packets by known fingerprinted hosts represented an 
anomalous condition, thus exposing the MITM attack. Their attack solution is included in 
a security application titled TopoGuard. TopoGuard also provides security solutions for 
other SDN network topology based attacks [4]. In this thesis, we recreate the MITM 
attack proposed by Hong et al. in a physical SDN environment and provide a solution for 
detection at the network layer rather than the application layer.  
Wang et al[9]. investigated the MITM attack presented by [4] under the same 
conditions proposed in this thesis. They were concerned with detection of the attack when 
the attackers attempted to hide by not generating application layer traffic. In that 
scenario, TopoGuard fails to detect the attack [4]. Their proposed solution relies on the 
detection of increasing delay of received LLDP packets at the controller [9]. If the round-
trip times (RTT) of LLDP packets observed by the controller exceed a previously 
established norm, it is assumed that they are being relayed inappropriately throughout the 
network, and the MITM attack is exposed. In contrast to their approach, we collect and 
analyze byte and packet data at all network switch ports and delay data at all 
communicating hosts for detection of anomalous conditions. Our detection scheme is 
capable of detecting and classifying the MITM attack in addition to other well-known 
cyber events. The approach taken by Wang et al. is solely concerned with detection of the 
MITM attack.   
Dhawan et al. [10] proposed and validated an SDN security application titled 
SPHINX designed to expose SDN network topology attacks such as the MITM attack. 
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The SPHINX security application detects anomalous network conditions based on 
comparisons of pre-established policies with a well maintained flow graph of observed 
network traffic. Similar to our approach, SPHINX also accounts for anomalous 
conditions arising from reported switch port traffic statistics [10]. The switch port 
measurements account for a single component of their detection scheme, whereas in this 
thesis traffic data based on byte, packet, and delay serve as the primary inputs to our 
detection scheme. Furthermore, we use wavelet analysis instead of policies and flow 
graphs to reveal anomalous conditions in traffic signals generated with byte, packet, and 
delay data.  
Wavelet analysis of traffic signals for the detection of anomalies has been widely 
researched and validated. Both online and offline anomaly detection methods utilizing 
wavelet analysis were presented in [6]–[8]. Our research primarily relies on the online 
detection method proposed by [8] in which wavelet analysis was conducted over network 
traffic signals using sliding windows, and anomalous conditions were exposed by 
comparisons with statistically established threshold values. The threshold values were 
determined from a wavelet analysis of normal traffic conditions. Some of the anomalous 
conditions considered for detection in [6]–[8] were introduced in conjunction with denial-
of-service (DoS) attacks, flash crowds, and network congestion. None of the network 
events or attacks considered for anomaly detection included a MITM attack. 
Additionally, the detection methods did not attempt to further classify the events or 
attacks. The traffic signals processed for anomaly detection in [8] were generated with 
packet header data. The traffic signals processed for anomaly detection in [6] consisted of 
byte, packet, and flow data. In our research, we extend the application of wavelet analysis 
to the detection of a MITM attack and introduce attack classification into our scheme 
based on reported anomalous conditions. Furthermore, we introduce delay data as another 
traffic signal input to our detection scheme.  
Lakhina et al. [11] detected anomalies for numerous network events and attacks 
such as DoS attacks, DDoS attacks, and flash crowds and proposed criteria for 
classification of the detected events and attacks. They analyzed byte, packet, and flow 
data for detection and localization of anomalous conditions related to the investigated 
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events and attacks. They classified the anomalies based on the traffic representations in 
which they were reported and their associated timing information. The classifications 
were validated through an observation of the reported anomalous characteristics [11]. 
They did not, however, investigate or present criteria for the classification of a MITM 
attack. In this thesis, we use the overall method introduced by [11] to present 
classification criteria for a MITM attack, DDoS attack, and network congestion. Our 
proposed classification criteria are solely based on the traffic representations in which the 
anomalous conditions were reported and do not rely on any observed characteristics of 
the anomalies for validation.      
D. ORGANIZATION  
This thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter II, we present background 
information related to the implementation of SDN, the cyber events investigated in this 
research, and the wavelet analysis method for anomaly detection. In Chapter III, we 
introduce the proposed detection and classification scheme. In Chapter IV, we detail the 
methods for emulating the cyber events in our physical SDN environment and present the 
results obtained from the detection scheme. In Chapter V, we provide conclusions based 
on a summary of the results and discuss areas for future work. In the appendices, we 
present the scripts used for realization of the MITM attack and implementation of our 
proposed detection scheme.    
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II. BACKGROUND 
The introduction of increased software solutions and centralized management to 
the networking environment through the adoption of SDN has presented numerous 
security risks. The MITM attack proposed by Hong et al [4]. and explored in this thesis 
takes advantage of security risks resulting from the centralized nature of SDN. In this 
thesis, we seek to provide a detection scheme for the MITM attack at the network layer 
by leveraging the capabilities of SDN and wavelet analysis. In this chapter, we present 
the key components of SDN. We introduce the strategic details pertaining to the 
realization of the SDN specific MITM attack and the additional cyber events tested 
within our detection scheme. Lastly, we provide an overview of wavelets and their 
applicability to anomaly detection. Wavelets represent the primary analysis tool used for 
detection of the MITM attack in our proposed solution. 
A. SOFTWARE-DEFINED NETWORKING OVERVIEW 
SDN removes the responsibility for routing decisions from individual, distributed 
networking components through a separation of the control and data planes [1]. Routing 
decisions, termed flow rules, are passed down to corresponding data plane switches by a 
central controller [1], [2]. The flow rules are maintained at each switch in flow tables and 
accessed for appropriate forwarding actions upon receipt of network traffic [2]. Desired 
actions are applied to received network traffic based on match and priority criteria 
defined in the flow rules [2]. Since flow rule actions determine packet forwarding, 
medium access control (MAC) addresses are not updated as the packets traverse the 
network [4]. The flow rules relayed by the controller are determined based on software 
applications designed and implemented by the network manager [1], [2]. The applications 
build flow rules using network topology information provided by the control plane [1]. 
Since the control plane is able to communicate with all the switches in the data plane, a 
complete topological view of the network is readily available [1]. The applications, 
controller, and switches exist at three logically or physically separated layers within the 
SDN framework according to the depiction in Figure 1.  
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Figure 1.  SDN Framework. Adapted from [2]. 
As evidenced by the framework displayed in Figure 1, layer-to-layer 
communication is facilitated by application programming interfaces (API). The control 
layer consists of a single controller or multiple controllers dependent on the setup of the 
network. If multiple controllers are used, separate APIs are also established between them 
for communication purposes. In this thesis, we are concerned with an SDN architecture 
consisting of physical switches at the infrastructure layer managed by a single SDN 
controller at the control layer. At the application layer, we employ software applications 
that implement port monitoring and topology view capabilities for security and MAC 
address forwarding for traffic routing.    
The OpenFlow protocol represents a standardized southbound API used to 
facilitate communication between the control layer and the infrastructure layer [1], [2]. 
We employ the OpenFlow protocol in our SDN environment. In accordance with the 
OpenFlow protocol detailed in [12], messages traversing the bidirectional OpenFlow 
channel represented by the link between the controller and the switches are broken down 
into three types. The first message type is specified as a controller-to-switch message. It 
facilitates switch management and topology updates. Two critical examples of the 
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controller-to-switch message type are the Modify-State message and the Packet-out 
message. The Modify-State message allows the controller to manage the flow rules in the 
switches, and the Packet-out message enables the controller to present information to the 
switches for further forwarding. The second message type is specified as an 
asynchronous message. Asynchronous messages enable the switches to pass network 
topology and event information to the controller. A primary example of an asynchronous 
message type is the Packet-in message. Packet-in messages represent packets forwarded 
to the controller from the data plane switches [12]. The final message type is not a 
significant part of this thesis and is therefore not addressed. In this thesis, we rely on the 
Modify-State messages, Packet-out messages, and Packet-in messages to control traffic 
routing at the switches, obtain switch port updates, and build a complete view of the 
network topology. Additionally, the Packet-out and Packet-in messages are key 
components for the realization of the investigated MITM attack [4].   
The northbound API, which facilitates communication between the application 
layer and control layer in accordance with Figure 1, is not defined by any current 
standards [2]. Specific details related to the northbound API are not of primary concern in 
this thesis.  
B. CYBER EVENTS 
In accordance with the stated objectives of this thesis, we seek to obtain traffic 
signals and anomalous conditions for multiple cyber events in order to compare them 
with the characteristics created by the MITM attack. An overview of the MITM attack 
studied in this thesis and the additional cyber events introduced for comparison are 
briefly presented in the following subsections.   
1. MITM Attack 
To develop a complete topology view at the SDN controller for input to the 
application layer, the controller must obtain link information between the switches in the 
data plane. The generally employed solution for link discovery by SDN controllers 
introduces the attack vector exploited by the investigated MITM attack [4].  
 10 
Link discovery is facilitated for SDN controllers and switches communicating via 
the OpenFlow protocol by LLDP packets [13]. The process by which the LLDP packets 
are deployed and the link information is received at the controller is illustrated in  
Figure 2.  
 
Figure 2.  SDN LLDP Based Link Discovery Process. Adapted from [13]. 
In accordance with the link discovery process depicted in Figure 2 and detailed in 
[13], individual LLDP packets are sent from the controller using Packet-out messages at a 
continuous interval. The Packet-out messages are sent for each switch and their 
associated switch ports in the data plane. A Packet-out message contains a single LLDP 
packet populated with the switch identifier for which the Packet-out message was sent 
and the switch port number for further forwarding of the LLDP packet. If the forwarded 
LLDP packet is received by another switch, the receiving switch generates a Packet-in 
message containing the received port number and the received LLDP packet. The Packet-
in message is then sent to the controller for creation of a directional link between the 
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forwarding switch port annotated in the LLDP packet and the received switch port 
annotated in the Packet-in message. If the forwarded LLDP packet is received by a host, 
it is dropped [13]. 
A sample Wireshark capture of a Packet-in message received at the controller 
during the link discovery process is displayed in Figure 3. The Packet-in message in 
Figure 3 coincides with the link discovery process displayed in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 3.  Sample Packet-in Message from the Link Discovery Process 
The OpenFlow extensible match (OXM) field observable in Figure 3 displays the 
port number that the LLDP packet from switch SW1 was received at switch SW2. The 
LLDP packet sent from the controller and forwarded by switch SW1 in Figure 2 is also 
displayed in the Packet-in message in Figure 3. The identifier for switch SW1 and the 
forwarding port at switch SW1 are clearly listed under the Link Layer Discovery Protocol 
heading. Based on the received Packet-in message displayed in Figure 3, the controller 
creates a link between port 1 of switch SW1 and port 2 of switch SW2.  
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The LLDP packets received at the network hosts open the door to the MITM 
attack investigated in this thesis. In accordance with the presented attack strategy in [4], 
LLDP packets received by two attacking hosts are relayed between each other over a 
maliciously constructed virtual or physical link instead of being dropped. The attack 
hosts represent previously compromised hosts in the SDN environment. A general 
example of the attack implementation with virtual tunnels is displayed in Figure 4.  
 
Figure 4.  SDN MITM Attack Example. Adapted from [4]. 
Upon receiving the relayed LLDP packets, the attack hosts forward them back to 
their respective switches, and Packet-in messages for transfer of the LLDP packets back 
to the controller are created [4]. Since the LLDP packets were sent from the attack hosts 
to the switches, the received port numbers annotated in the Packet-in messages are 
associated with the attack hosts. This causes the controller to record a false link between 
the switches and through the attack hosts. After the controller updates switch-specific 
flow rules related to the false link, target host traffic is transmitted to the attack hosts and 
forwarded to the intended destination via a malicious virtual or physical link [4]. In 
Figure 4, the attack tunnels are used to relay the LLDP packets between the attack hosts 
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for creation of the false link. The target traffic redirection tunnel is used to transfer the 
target host traffic to its intended destination. The false link and the redirection of target 
traffic through the attack hosts create the conditions for the MITM attack [4].  
In [4], direct tunnels are not established between the attack hosts as displayed in 
Figure 4. Instead, the LLDP packets and target host traffic are relayed between the attack 
hosts via an additional compromised host on the network. Implementing the attack in this 
thesis using the directly connected tunnels displayed in Figure 4 represents a simpler 
approach based on the overall attack strategy presented by [4].   
2. DDOS Attack 
A primary focus or strategy for the successful realization of denial of services is 
to overwhelm a target through bandwidth utilization [14]. A user datagram packet (UDP) 
flood represents a subset of DDoS attacks with this aim [15]. A typical UDP flood attack 
involves an attacker employing a network of controlled computers to produce a large 
volume of UDP packets destined for a target server [14], [15]. The flooding of the UDP 
packets hijacks the target server’s available bandwidth and therefore cuts it off from the 
rest of the network [15]. We use the strategy employed by UDP flooding to achieve a 
DDoS attack against a target host in our SDN environment.   
3. Network Congestion 
Network congestion is represented by an observed reduction in throughput with 
increasing traffic volume [16]. It is typically experienced when the traffic volume 
overwhelms the capacity of the buffers in switching and routing devices [16]. The 
primary consequence of network congestion is congestive collapse where the throughput 
is reduced to levels that prevent communication between network devices [16]. In our 
SDN network, we seek to realize periods of congestive collapse between two hosts by 
introducing network congestion at an intermediate switch along a specified 
communication path.  
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C. WAVELETS  
Wavelet analysis decomposes high and low frequency information in a signal into 
time and scale [17]. In wavelet analysis, a scaled wavelet with finite duration and zero 
mean is shifted across a signal to produce coefficient values representative of the 
wavelet’s similarity to the processed portion of the signal [17]. The continuous wavelet 
transform coefficient values are calculated as given by [17]  
 ( , ) ( ) ( , , )C x t t dtα β ψ α β
∞
−∞
= ∫ , (1) 
where C(α,β) is the wavelet coefficient, α is the wavelet scale, β is the wavelet position, 
x(t) is the signal, and ψ(α,β,t) is the wavelet. The position shifting and scaling of the 
wavelet for coefficient determination is displayed in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5.  Shifting and Scaling the Wavelet Function. Adapted from [17]. 
 In accordance with Figure 5, the wavelet at a particular scale 1α α=  is shifted 
across the signal for calculation of the coefficient values at different signal positions β. 
The wavelet scale is then decreased to 2α α= , stretching the duration of the wavelet, and 
additional coefficient values are obtained at the signal positions β. This process is 
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repeated for all scale values. Lower-scale values reveal abrupt, short-duration changes in 
the signal, while higher-scale values reveal longer-duration changes in the signal [17]. 
The scale value is limited by available computational capabilities [17].  
 In order to decompose the signals at faster speeds, the discrete wavelet transform 
(DWT) restricts the scaling and position values used in the analysis to powers of two 
[17]. High-pass and low-pass filters facilitate signal decomposition with the DWT and 
produce the coefficient values for an input signal at different scaling values. The low-pass 
filter generates approximation coefficients a[n], which are associated with low-frequency 
signal components exposed by high-scale values. The high-pass filter generates detail 
coefficients d[n] which are associated with high-frequency signal components exposed by 
low-scale values [17].  
The DWT is capable of decomposing an input signal x[n] at multiple resolution 
levels [17]. After obtaining the detail and approximation coefficients from an input signal 
x[n], the filtering process is repeated with the generated approximation coefficients 
serving as the new input to the high and low-pass filters. The first set of approximation 
and detail coefficients obtained from the input of a signal x[n] reflect the outputs of the 
DWT at level 1. The second set of approximation and detail coefficients obtained from 
the input of the level 1 approximation coefficients reflect the output of the DWT at level 
2. Subsequent levels of approximation and detail coefficients are further obtained from 
the previous level’s approximation coefficients [17]. The approximation and detail 
coefficients at each level of the DWT are given by [18] 
 1[ ] [ 2 ] [ ]j j
i




= −∑   (2) 
and 
 1[ ] [ 2 ] [ ]j j
i




= −∑ . (3) 
In Equations (2) and (3), [ ]2h i n−  represents the low-pass filter with down sampling, 
[ ]2g i n−  represents the high-pass filter with down sampling, and 1j ≥  represents the 
DWT level. Additionally, 0[ ]a n  represents the original signal x[n].  
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The decomposed detail and approximation coefficients defined in Equations (2) 
and (3) do not match up with the time scale from the original signal x[n] due to down 
sampling in the filtering process; therefore, they need to be reconstructed using similar 
filters with up sampling [17], [18]. Upon reconstruction, the detail and approximation 
coefficients correspond to the time scale of the original signal x[n], and the low and high-
frequency components extracted by the wavelet analysis are observable at the various 
levels. Furthermore, the reconstructed coefficient values can be combined to obtain the 
original signal [17]:  
 
1




x n A n D n
=
= +∑   (4) 
where A[n] and D[n] represent the reconstructed approximation coefficients a[n] and 
detail coefficients d[n], respectively, and 1j ≥  represents the DWT level.  
Each successive DWT level provides a lower-resolution decomposition of the 
original signal x[n] and is, therefore, able to reveal additional information [17]. In  
Figure 6, example reconstructed approximation and detail coefficient outputs at multiple 
levels of the DWT filtering process are displayed for a signal input x[n]. At level 3, we 
begin to observe more distinct information in the reconstructed detail coefficients of the 
transformed signal x[n].  
      
Figure 6.  DWT Decomposition. Adapted from [17]. 
level 2  
level 1  
level 3  
A3[n]  D3[n]  
A2[n]  D2[n]  
D1[n]  A1[n]  
x[n]  
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In this thesis, we decompose captured traffic signals with the DWT and use the 
reconstructed detail coefficients at multiple levels of the DWT to reveal high-frequency 
components in the signals [8]. Comparisons of the high frequency components with 
predetermined threshold values expose anomalous conditions in our traffic signals. As 
previously stated, the employment of wavelets to the anomaly detection problem is 
validated by research presented in [6]–[8].  
In this chapter, we presented the necessary background information required to 
implement and test our proposed detection scheme. We started the chapter by introducing 
the components and basic operation of SDN. We then detailed the cyber events to be 
detected and classified. We ended the chapter with a description of wavelets and their 
applicability to anomaly detection. 
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III. PROPOSED SCHEME FOR MITM ATTACK DETECTION 
AND CLASSIFICATION 
The overall goal of this thesis is to detect and classify the SDN MITM attack 
proposed by [4] at the network layer based on its observed traffic signals. The proposed 
solution focuses on wavelet analysis for detection of anomalous traffic introduced by the 
attack and the localization of the detected anomalies for classification. Additional cyber 
events are introduced to the network in order to confirm the uniqueness of the detected 
anomalous traffic conditions for the MITM attack and validate the general applicability 
of the detection scheme.  
We start this chapter by presenting the proposed scheme for detection and 
classification of cyber events on a SDN. We then detail the subcomponents of the 
proposed detection scheme.   
A. PROPOSED SCHEME 
As evidenced by previous research conducted in [6]–[8], a wavelet based analysis 
of traffic data for the detection of anomalies is valid. While [6]–[8] primarily expose 
anomalies relating to flash crowds, DoS attacks, port scans, and DDoS attacks, we extend 
their general approach to the detection of the SDN MITM attack presented in this thesis. 
The framework of our scheme is displayed in Figure 7 and is similar to the online 
anomaly detection schemes proposed in [7] and [8] with the addition of an anomaly 
classification phase. Individual details pertaining to the proposed detection scheme are 
detailed in the following sections. 
 
Figure 7.  Proposed Anomaly Detection and Classification Scheme 
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B. COLLECTING TRAFFIC DATA 
In order to obtain representations of the traffic signals related to the cyber events 
emulated in the network, byte, packet, and delay data are collected for host to host 
communications on the network. The network components involved in collection of byte, 
packet, and delay data within the general SDN environment employed in this thesis are 
displayed in Figure 8. The locations where byte and packet data are collected are outlined 
in blue. The locations where delay data is collected are outlined in green.  
 
Figure 8.  Data Collection in the SDN Environment 
As depicted in Figure 8, byte and packet data are collected for both received and 
sent traffic at each active switch port on the network. The collection of this data is 
facilitated by an extension to the routing application running at the controller. The 
centralized nature of the controller and its inherent separation from the data plane makes 
this a simple and non-invasive task. The sampling rate is a variable parameter and can be 
adjusted by editing the controller application. The per-port traffic data is dumped to a 
separate file for generation of the corresponding cyber event traffic signals. The 
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generated traffic signals are then introduced as inputs to the data processing phase of the 
proposed detection scheme. 
Traffic delay data between two communicating network hosts depicted in Figure 
8 are captured using a software application at the receiving hosts. Collection of delay data 
is conducted passively and is focused on RTT between hosts in order to mitigate the 
requirement for synchronized network clocks critical to capturing one way delay [19]. 
The sampling rate is equal to that used for the collection of byte and packet data. The 
delay data are used to generate the delay signals for the cyber events. While the delay 
data are collected at the receiving hosts, for anomaly classification purposes it is referred 
to as if it were collected at the associated switch ports of the hosts. The delay signals 
serve as the third input to the data processing phase.  
C. PROCESSING TRAFFIC DATA 
The data inputs to the processing phase of our scheme are represented by the 
decomposition of each cyber event’s traffic into captured byte, packet, and delay signals. 
The data points in the corresponding signals each represent a sampled value. The input 
signals x[n] are processed separately and incrementally with the DWT based on the 
method presented in [8]. The specific wavelet used and its corresponding number of 
levels are selected by the network administrator.  
Incremental processing with wavelets is conducted in accordance with a sliding 
window of length Nx samples, an even integer [8]. At each increment of the sliding 
window, the sample points of the input signal x[n] that fall within the window are 
processed with the DWT. The detail coefficients produced by the DWT at each level are 
then reconstructed in order to expose the anomalous conditions within the timescale of 
the original signal x[n]. The sliding window moves across the input signal x[n] until all 
signal values have been transformed with the DWT and reconstructed at each wavelet 
level [8].  
The maximum number of wavelet levels l used to process x[n] is limited by the 
sliding window length Nx, such that [8] 
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 2log xl N= . (5) 
To account for edge effects as the sliding window moves across the signal inputs, an 
overlap parameter v is defined as  
 xv pN= , (6) 
where p is the desired percentage of overlap between successive windows.  
A signal input x[n] consisting of N samples, an even integer, can have a maximum 






=  − 
. (7) 
From Nw, we obtain an increment vector 1N

 such that          
 [ ]1 2,3, 4,..., 1wN N= −

. (8) 
With the increment vector 1N

 and maximum number of sliding window increments Nw, 
we define the right edge of the sliding window as  
 ( ) ( )2 1 1, [ ] [ ] 1 ,..., 2x x w xN N N k N N k v N N = − − − 
  
 (9) 
for 1, 2,3,..., 2wk N= − ; therefore, based on the defined parameters, the sliding window 
for application of the DWT moving across input x[n] has intervals
[ ] [ ]2 21 ,xx N j N x N j    − +    
 
 for 1,2,3,..., wj N= . The sliding window method defined 
by Equations (6)-(9) is displayed in Figure 9.   
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Figure 9.  Sliding Window Method for Input Signal x[n] 
In accordance with Figure 9, the DWT is applied to the sliding window intervals
[ ] [ ]2 21 ,xx N j N x N j    − +    
 
. The DWT produces detail coefficients representative of 
the input signal x[n] within each sliding window interval, which are then reconstructed at 
their corresponding levels by forming a 




















,  (10) 
where m denotes the numbered interval over which the DWT was applied. Each row in 
matrix Ym therefore represents the transformation of x[n] at the indicated sliding window 
interval and corresponding wavelet level. In total, for an x[n] there are Nw matrix outputs 
Ym each containing transformed and reconstructed representations of x[n] at the specified 
interval and levels. These matrices are passed to the anomaly detection phase 
successively for further evaluation.  
D. DETECTING ANOMALIES 
The input Ym to the detection phase of the proposed scheme consists of level 
specific reconstructed detail coefficients for the previously defined sliding window 
intervals over which the DWT was applied. The method of detecting anomalies for an 
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input Ym is again adopted from [8] in which a detection window is used to determine 
initial anomalies at a specified level, and the reoccurrence of anomalies across multiple 
levels determines their validity. To represent the reconstructed detail coefficients at each 
wavelet level, the rows of a matrix input Ym are arranged into separate row vectors yL

for



















The detection window searches for anomalies at each wavelet level by moving 
incrementally across the row vectors yL

of the reconstructed detail coefficients. The 
detection window length is Nd samples, where d xN N≤  [8] and is an even integer. 
Counter to the application of the sliding window for the DWT, the starting position of the 
detection window increments by one sample at a time [8]. The detection window 
intervals are defined by [ ] [ ], 1y y dL k L k N + − 
 
 for 1, 2,3,..., x dk N N= − . At each 
interval, the mean absolute deviation M is calculated as [20]  
 [ ] [ ]
11 [ ] , 1
dk N
y y y d
i kd




 = − + − ∑
  
 (12) 
and compared with a predefined threshold value γlev [7]. If the threshold value γlev is 
exceeded, an initial anomaly is logged for the corresponding wavelet level [8]. The 
interval of the anomaly is defined within the original signal x[n] by
[ ] [ ]2 21 , 1x x dx N j N k x N j N k N    − + + − + + +    
 
. 
Once all the anomalies are detected for each wavelet level within a matrix Ym, 
anomalies appearing in multiple levels are logged [8]. If the number of occurrences for 
each anomaly across all the wavelet levels meets or exceeds the predefined threshold  
γrep, they are reported as valid anomalies [8]. Using the windowed approach for the DWT 
and detection window in concert with the two phase threshold comparison is shown to 
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minimize false alarms [8]. The decision process for anomaly detection as previously 
described is further illustrated by the flowchart in Figure 10. 
 
Figure 10.  Anomaly Detection Flowchart 
It is assumed that a specific host switch port will not experience simultaneous 
cyber events. To mitigate subsequent or overlapping anomalies being reported for the 
same cyber event conditions, the intervals between reported anomalies for an x[n] must 
be separated by a specified number of samples defined as a back-off period Pb, given by 
 b xP qN= , (13) 
where q is the percentage of back off. Two detected anomalies that are not separated by 
the specified back-off period are considered a single anomaly with an inclusive interval.  
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The threshold values γlev used to detect initial anomalies within the wavelet levels 
are determined using statistical analysis [8]. Statistical methods for anomaly detection 
base the determination of anomalies on their inability to conform to an assumed 
stochastic model [21]. When a Gaussian distribution is selected as the assumed stochastic 
model for the data under consideration, a threshold of 3σ from the mean represents the 
boundary for conforming observations, where σ is the standard deviation [21]. Data 
observations outside of the 3σ boundary are logged as anomalies [21].  
In [8], traffic data under normal operation is fit to a Gaussian distribution by 
sampling enough traffic to meet the conditions of the central limit theorem, analyzing the 
data with the DWT, and rebuilding a representation of the data by combining the 
reconstructed detail coefficients from the specific levels of the DWT. The basis for 
rebuilding a representation of the original traffic data by combining the reconstructed 
detail coefficients is supported by Equation (4). In this case, the reconstructed 
approximation coefficients jA  are set to zero, and only the reconstructed detail 
coefficients are considered. Setting the reconstructed approximation coefficients to zero 
and combining the reconstructed detail coefficients results in a representation of the 
original traffic signal that is Gaussian and justifies the use of statistical analysis for the 
assignment of threshold values [8]. Upon validating that the representation of the normal 
traffic data satisfies the Gaussian requirement, the authors establish threshold values for 
anomaly detection based on the standard deviations of the reconstructed detail 
coefficients at each DWT level [8]. 
We apply the same overall method for assignment of our threshold values γlev. 
Normal traffic signals without injection of the previously specified cyber events are 
collected at the switch ports of two communicating hosts and transformed with the DWT. 
The normal traffic signals consist of received bytes, sent bytes, received packets, sent 
packets, and delay. The detail coefficients associated with each normal traffic signal are 
then reconstructed, combined, and fit to a Gaussian distribution to validate the use of 
statistical analysis. Upon validating the Gaussian requirement, we assign threshold values 
γlev at each switch port of the communicating hosts based on the standard deviations of 
the represented normal traffic signals obtained by combining the reconstructed detail 
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coefficients. As a result, we assign five threshold values γlev at a single port; each 
threshold value is associated with a collected normal traffic signal at the port. Contrary to 
[8], we do not assign separate threshold values for each DWT level of a normal traffic 
signal in an effort to reduce false positives. Further efforts to reduce false positives are 
implemented by considering threshold values consisting of 3σ and 4σ in Chapter IV. 
Both threshold values were shown to be acceptable in [8].  
The threshold value γrep represents the desired number of repeat occurrences of an 
anomaly across employed wavelet levels [8]. The value is used to tune the detection 
method to obtain the best results possible and reduce false positives. The selected value is 
not based on mathematical observations.  
E. CLASSIFYING ANOMALIES 
The inputs to the anomaly classification phase of our proposed scheme consist of 
the confirmed anomalies output by the detection phase. The flowchart for determination 
of the MITM attack explored in this thesis is displayed in Figure 11. The flowchart was 
constructed based on initial observations of traffic characteristics during emulations of 
the specific cyber events of interest. While it was not the primary objective of this thesis, 
in addition to the MITM attack, we are able to individually classify the DDoS and 
congestion cyber events. The method for cyber event classification based on the 
localization of anomalous conditions in network traffic signals was validated in [11].  
Based on Figure 11, anomalous traffic reported at each port on a switch is 
considered for classification of the introduced cyber events. The DDoS and congestion 
cyber events are classified based on the detection of anomalies in the delay signal and the 
byte or packet signals at a single port. The congestion cyber event is further differentiated 
from the DDoS attack by a lack of detected anomalies in the sent byte or packet signals. 
The MITM cyber event is classified based on the presence of anomalous traffic at two 
different ports on a switch. Anomalous conditions at each port will lead to a conditional 
classification of the MITM attack via the different paths represented in the flowchart. The 
switch port associated with a target host of the MITM attack will experience anomalies in 
the measured delay signal but not the measured byte or packet signals. The switch port 
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associated with an attacking host will experience anomalies in the measured received or 
sent byte or packet signals but not the measured delay signal. The indication of a possible 
MITM attack at both ports confirms the classification of the cyber event. While the 
MITM attack involves attacking and target hosts on two different switches, anomalies 
only need to be observed at one of the switches to successfully classify the cyber event. 
 
Figure 11.  Cyber Event Classification Flowchart 
In this chapter, we presented the proposed scheme for detection and classification 
of the selected cyber events of interest and detailed its individual components. The 
detection scheme employs wavelet and statistical analysis for the exposure and reporting 
of anomalous conditions related to these cyber events. Further classification of the cyber 
events is based on a decision flowchart developed using initial observations of traffic 




In order to validate the proposed detection scheme presented in Chapter III, we 
emulated a MITM attack [4], a DDoS attack, and network congestion in our physical 
SDN environment. Using collected traffic signals from the corresponding cyber events, 
we processed the signals using wavelet analysis and compared the analyzed signals with 
predetermined threshold values for anomaly detection. The uniqueness of the reported 
anomalies for the individual cyber events served as logic based indicators for the 
classification flowchart presented in Chapter III.  
The results obtained in this thesis are presented in the following sections. First, 
we present a detailed description of our physical SDN environment and the software 
applications used to generate and capture necessary traffic signals. Next, we detail the 
implementation of the cyber events in the physical SDN environment and present the 
captured traffic signals for those cyber events. Lastly, we present the detailed results 
obtained from the processing, detection, and classification phases of our proposed 
scheme. All captured byte signals for the respective tests were converted to bits in order 
to more clearly reveal the anomalous conditions in the associated plots. Yet, they are still 
referred to as byte signals throughout this thesis.  
A. SDN ENVIRONMENT AND TRAFFIC CAPTURES 
The physical SDN environment used for the collection of traffic signals related to 
the cyber events presented in Chapter II is displayed in Figure 13. The control plane 
consisted of a Ryu controller running the Ryu applications simple_monitor13.py and 
gui_topology.py [22]. The simple_monitor13.py application created the initial flow rules 
on the network for host-to-host communication and collected the byte and packet data at 
the switch ports for the generation of traffic signals [23]. For each cyber event introduced 
to the network, the switch ports were sampled at one second intervals, and the data was 
separated based on received and sent traffic. The gui_topology.py application provided a 
topology display of the data plane at the controller [24]. To obtain the links to build the 
topology view at the controller, the gui_topology.py application relies on switches.py 
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which employs the vulnerable LLDP packets necessary to realize the SDN MITM attack 
[4], [22]. We confirmed the successful implementation of the SDN MITM attack upon 
observing the creation of a false link in the topology view. The operating system 
employed on the controller was Ubuntu 14.04 LTS. 
The data plane consisted of three Hewlett Packard (HP) E3800 switches 
connected to the controller via a NETGEAR GS516T switch. There were 16 hosts 
connected to the data plane switches. The hosts consisted of Raspberry Pi’s running the 
Ubuntu 16.04 LTS operating system and personal computers running the Ubuntu 14.04 
LTS operating system. The controller and HP switches were configured to communicate 
via the OpenFlow version 1.3 protocol.  
 
Figure 13.  Physical SDN Environment 
Traffic was generated within the network test environment using the iperf tool 
[25]. An iperf server session was created on each receiving host prior to running the 
cyber event tests. To send the traffic, iperf client sessions were started on each sending 
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host remotely from host 10.10.14.6 using a bourne-again shell script. All generated traffic 
consisted of UDP streams. Each test was conducted for over an hour in order to obtain 
3,600 samples for each traffic signal. The traffic sampling period was one second.  
The RTT data for generation of the delay signals was calculated using synthetic 
packet-pairs (SPP) as described in [19]. The SPP tool enables captured packets between 
two communicating hosts to be analyzed for accurate RTT calculations based on 
introduced time stamps at the capture nodes [19]. The tool can be configured to operate in 
multiple modes, both online and offline, dependent on a network manager’s desires and 
tolerance for overhead [19]. In our mode of operation, we captured packet traces for two 
communicating hosts and combined the packet traces offline to be analyzed by the SPP 
tool. The SPP tool does not provide the option to set the sampling period; therefore, the 
final data was converted to represent a one-second sampling period.  
Traffic signals were only generated from collected traffic data at host ports 
necessary to detect and classify the cyber events considered. These ports were assigned 
based on initial observations of anomalous conditions introduced by the cyber events.  
B. CYBER EVENT TRAFFIC SIGNALS 
The cyber events were emulated in the SDN environment during separate tests. 
Each test consisted of a period of normal traffic prior to the introduction of a cyber event 
in order to validate our method of detection. As stated previously, each test was 
conducted for more than an hour in order to obtain a minimum of 3,600 samples of the 
byte, packet, and delay traffic signals.      
1. MITM Attack 
We implemented the MITM attack presented by [4] in our physical SDN 
environment using a combination of virtual tunnels, Linux bridges, and virtual interfaces. 
The attack details are illustrated in Figure 14. The attack hosts are highlighted in red and 




Figure 14.  MITM Attack Implementation  
In accordance with the MITM attack strategy described in Chapter II and further 
illustrated in Figure 14, the attack hosts 10.10.12.2 and 10.10.14.2 captured LLDP 
packets from switches 10.10.0.12 and 10.10.0.14 at their physical interfaces, eth0. These 
captured LLDP packets were then relayed to their respective virtual interfaces, tap0 and 
tap1, for transport over the virtual tunnels linking the attack hosts together. The 
Daemonlogger tool [26] was used to capture and relay the LLDP packets between the 
physical and virtual interfaces. The tunnels were set up with the VTun (short for Virtual 
Tunnel) protocol for Linux [27]. When the attack hosts received each other’s relayed 
LLDP packets at the terminating ends of the virtual tunnels, the LLDP packets were 
forwarded to their physical interfaces, eth0, using Daemonlogger and sent to their 
associated switches. The switches then populated Packet-in messages with their 
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respective information and the relayed LLDP packets for transmission back to the 
controller. Upon receipt of the Packet-in messages with the relayed LLDP packets at the 
controller, the topological view was updated with a false bidirectional link and new flow 
rules were manually installed to account for the false link information. A third tunnel was 
then set up between the attack hosts in order to deliver the traffic redirected by the 
updated flow rules to the target hosts 10.10.12.1 and 10.10.14.1.  
To maintain the MITM attack, the LLDP packets were continuously relayed 
between the attack hosts. If the LLDP relay was interrupted, the false link was no longer 
recognizable at the controller, and the attack ended. Utilizing separate tunnels to relay the 
LLDP packets between the attack hosts ensured the stability of the attack. The 
topological view at the controller representing our successful implementation of the 
MITM attack is displayed in Figure 15. The false link is represented by the connection 
between switches 10.10.0.12 and 10.10.0.14.  
 
Figure 15.  Ryu Topology View of MITM Attack 
To capture the traffic signals associated with the attack, received byte and packet 
data was collected at the port for the attack host 10.10.12.2 on switch 10.10.0.12. Sent 
byte and packet data was ignored due to its similarities to the received byte and packet 
data. Delay data was collected between the target hosts 10.10.12.1 and 10.10.14.1. To 
start the test, separate bidirectional UDP streams were established between the target 
hosts and the attack hosts. Additional UDP streams were established between other 
network hosts in order to provide background traffic. All traffic flowed through the 






normal traffic conditions. At about the 20-minute mark, the MITM attack was initiated, 
and the bidirectional UDP stream between the target hosts was redirected through the 
attack hosts. All other UDP streams continued to flow through the network normally. The 
traffic signals associated with the attack are displayed in Figure 16. The signals represent 
the received byte and packet data captured at the switch port of the attack host 10.10.12.2 
and the delay data captured at the target host 10.10.12.1. Each signal reflects the 
anomalous conditions introduced by the attack.  
 
Figure 16.  MITM Attack Traffic Signals Captured at Hosts 10.10.12.1 (Bottom) 
and 10.10.12.2 (Top and Middle) 
As evidenced by the displayed signals in Figure 16, the attack host experiences a 
sharp increase in its received byte and packet signals upon implementation of the attack. 
This is caused by the redirection of the target host traffic through the attack host. The 
attack host 10.10.12.2 receives all of the traffic sent by the target host 10.10.12.1 in 
addition to the normal traffic being sent to it from the other attack host 10.10.14.2. The 
delay signal between the communicating target hosts also experiences a sharp increase 
when the attack is implemented. This is caused by redirection of the traffic and the added 
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processing delay imposed at the attack hosts. The traffic must travel to the attack hosts 
before being sent over the virtual link to its intended destinations. 
The collected traffic signals for the MITM attack displayed in Figure 16 are 
representative of the anomalous conditions observed during the test. All other traffic 
signals or delay signals associated with the ports and hosts of switch 10.10.0.12 did not 
reveal significant anomalous conditions for classification of the attack; therefore, they 
were ignored.    
2. DDOS Attack 
We implemented the DDoS attack in our physical SDN environment using nine 
attack hosts. The DDoS attack type was a UDP flood. The attack scenario is illustrated in 
Figure 17. The green host represents the target, and the red hosts represent the attackers.     
 
Figure 17.  DDoS Attack Implementation 
To start the test, a normal bidirectional UDP stream was established between 
hosts 10.10.12.1 and 10.10.14.1. The attack target was host 10.10.12.1. To realize the 
attack conditions at the target host port, UDP streams were established from the nine 
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attacking hosts to the target host. The DDoS attack was introduced after 20 minutes of 
normal traffic and lasted for 10 minutes. The overall test was conducted for more than an 
hour in order to collect 3,600 samples representing normal and attack traffic. The switch 
port for the target host 10.10.12.1 was restricted to a data rate of 10 Mbps in order to 
achieve the attack conditions with the limited resources available in the test environment. 
Based on the collected delay data and traffic statistics at the target host port, 
traffic signals were generated to highlight the effects of the DDoS attack. The byte and 
packet signals are representative of received and sent traffic statistics at the target host 
port. The delay signal is representative of experienced RTTs between the communicating 
hosts 10.10.12.1 and 10.10.14.1. The traffic signals generated from the captured byte and 
packet data are displayed in Figure 18. The traffic signal generated from the delay data is 
displayed in Figure 19. Anomalous conditions caused by the introduction of the DDoS 
attack are clearly visible in these figures.  
  
Figure 18.  DDoS Attack Byte and Packet Signals Captured at Host 10.10.12.1 
 37 
 
Figure 19.  DDoS Attack Delay Signal Captured at Host 10.10.12.1 
In Figure 18, the received byte signal increases from about 3 Mbps under normal 
traffic conditions to 10 Mbps upon initiation of the attack. This is a result of the attacking 
hosts flooding the target host with UDP traffic. Similarly, the received packet signal 
jumps from about 250 packets per second to 800 packets per second when the attack is 
introduced.  
The impacts of the attack are also observable in the sent traffic signals of  
Figure 18 and the delay signal of Figure 19. The sent traffic signals begin to fall to zero, 
and communication between hosts 10.10.12.1 and 10.10.14.1 starts to break down as the 
attacking hosts overtake the available bandwidth at the target host. In Figure 19, the delay 
signal increases from less than 1 ms under normal traffic conditions to over 400 ms under 
attack conditions. Overall, the combination of anomalous conditions provides valuable 
information required to differentiate the DDoS attack from the other emulated cyber 
events. 
3. Congestion 
We introduced congestion to the network at switch 10.10.0.13. The process by 
which the congestion was implemented is displayed in Figure 20. The switch and link 
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highlighted in red represent the congested components. For the test, traffic was generated 
on the network by establishing UDP streams between paired hosts with iperf. As 
displayed in Figure 20, the data rate was limited to 10 Mbps at port 2 of switch 
10.10.0.13 in order to force congested conditions for traffic traversing the link between 
switches 10.10.0.13 and 10.10.0.14.  
 
Figure 20.  Introduction of Network Congestion 
During the test, we collected traffic data on switch 10.10.0.12 at the port 
associated with host 10.10.12.1. Delay data was collected between communicating hosts 
10.10.12.1 and 10.10.14.1. The test was conducted for over an hour in order to obtain 
3,600 samples of the traffic data. The test was started by only generating traffic between 
hosts 10.10.12.1 and 10.10.14.1 in order to obtain normal traffic data. After a period of 
about 20 minutes, the rest of the communicating host pairs began to generate traffic. We 
were able to observe the effects of congestion in the network as the traffic volume 
overwhelmed the 10 Mbps capacity at port 2 of switch 10.10.0.13. The traffic signals 
displaying the effects of the introduced congestion at the switch port for host 10.10.12.1 
are displayed in Figure 21.  
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Figure 21.  Congestion Traffic Signals Captured at Host 10.10.12.1 
In Figure 21, the traffic signals are representative of received traffic data at the 
switch port for host 10.10.12.1 and delay data experienced between host 10.10.12.1 and 
10.10.14.1. The effects of congestion are clearly observable. The byte and packet rates 
begin to drop and the delay increases at the 20-minute mark when congestion is initiated 
in the network.  
The sent byte and packet signals collected at the switch port for host 10.10.12.1 
are displayed in Figure 22. The signals do not reveal any observable anomalous 
conditions resulting from congestion. The data rates are relatively constant. This is 
consistent with expectations since the effects of congestion on sent traffic from host 
10.10.12.1 are only introduced at switch 10.10.0.13. We collected sent traffic data at the 
switch port associated with host 10.10.12.1 before it traversed the congested switch link. 
The lack of anomalous conditions in the sent byte or packet signals for the congestion 
cyber event is a key differentiator from the DDoS attack in the anomaly classification 
flowchart displayed in Figure 11.  
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Figure 22.  Sent Traffic Signals Captured at Host 10.10.12.1 for Congestion 
C. DETECTION OF THE CYBER EVENTS 
After collecting the traffic signals containing observable anomalous conditions for 
the emulated cyber events, our next step was to autonomously detect and report the 
anomalies. To accomplish this task, the traffic signals presented in the previous sections 
were passed to the data processing and anomaly detection phases of the scheme displayed 
in Figure 7. The data processing and anomaly detection phases were implemented in 
MATLAB.  
1. Determination of the Threshold Values 
In order to determine the threshold values γlev for anomaly detection, normal 
traffic was generated in the physical SDN environment, and data signals were collected 
for wavelet processing. Based on the previously presented traffic signals, anomalous 
conditions for the introduced cyber events were observed at the switch ports for hosts 
10.10.12.1 and 10.10.12.2; therefore, bidirectional UDP streams were established 
between hosts 10.10.12.1 and 10.10.14.1 and hosts 10.10.12.2 and 10.10.14.2 for 
collection of delay and port traffic data under normal network conditions. The UDP 
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streams were maintained for a time duration exceeding an hour in order to obtain traffic 
signals consisting of 3,600 samples. The baseline traffic signals related to byte and packet 
data were obtained for received and sent traffic at the associated switch ports to hosts 
10.10.12.1 and 10.10.12.2. The baseline traffic signal related to delay data was obtained 
for the communicating host pair 10.10.12.1 and 10.10.14.1. The traffic signals for 
baseline traffic conditions at hosts 10.10.12.1 and 10.10.12.2 are displayed in Figures 23–
25. Contrary to the traffic signals displayed in Figures 16, 18, 19, and 21, there are no 
anomalous conditions observable in the traffic signals displayed in Figures 23–25. The 
byte and packet signals in Figures 23 and 25 maintain a relatively consistent data rate of 1 
Mbps and packet rate of 86 packets per second, respectively. The delay signal in Figure 
24 stays fairly constant at 0.91 ms. These baseline traffic signals are used for determining 
the threshold values γlev at the switch ports for hosts 10.10.12.1 and 10.10.12.2.   
 
Figure 23.  Normal Traffic Signals Captured at Host 10.10.12.1 
 42 
 
Figure 24.  Normal Delay Signal Captured at Host 10.10.12.1 
 
Figure 25.  Normal Traffic Signals Captured at Host 10.10.12.2 
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In this thesis, we chose to use the Daubechies-1 wavelet to process traffic signals 
for anomaly detection and determination of the threshold values associated with normal 
traffic conditions. The Daubechies wavelet family was shown to successfully expose 
anomalous traffic in [8]. In [8], the Daubechies-6 wavelet was used. We found that the 
Daubechies-1 wavelet produced better results for anomaly detection in our collected 
traffic signals.  
To obtain the threshold values for anomaly detection at the switch ports for hosts 
10.10.12.1 and 10.10.12.2, the traffic signals displayed in Figures 23–25 were 
decomposed at six wavelet levels. The detail coefficients at each level were then 
combined to obtain representations of each signal. As discussed in Chapter III, Section D, 
the assignment of threshold values based on statistical analysis is reliant on the 
transformed representations of the normal traffic signals being Gaussian [8], [21]. The 
histograms of the transformed signal representations are displayed in Figures 26–28.  
Figure 26.  Histograms of Transformed Signal Representations for Normal Traffic 
at Host 10.10.12.1 
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Figure 27.  Histogram of Transformed Signal Representation for Normal Delay 
Data at Host 10.10.12.1 
 
Figure 28.  Histograms of Transformed Signal Representations for Normal Traffic 
at Host 10.10.12.2 
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The histograms resemble the characteristics of a Gaussian distribution; therefore, the 
threshold values γlev for each host switch port were assigned based on the standard 
deviations of their transformed signal representations. The threshold values γlev for 
anomaly detection at the host switch ports impacted by the introduced cyber events are 
presented in Table 1. Threshold values were only obtained for traffic signals that 
displayed observable anomalous conditions during each cyber event.  




In [8], upon validating that the combined detail coefficients for a transformed 
normal traffic signal fit to a Gaussian distribution, separate threshold values were 
assigned based on the standard deviations of the detail coefficients at each reconstructed 
wavelet level. We found that using a single threshold value based on the standard 
deviations of the combined detail coefficients resulted in fewer false positives when 
applied to the reconstructed wavelet levels of anomalous traffic. We presume that this 
was due to limited variability observed in our baseline traffic signals. Overall, the use of 
a single threshold value for each transformed signal representation provided more 
conservative requirements for determination of anomalies, thereby reducing the overall 
number of false positives.  
2. Determination of the Detection Parameters 
Several parameters for the data processing and detection methods proposed in 
Chapter III were examined in order to determine the values that most accurately exposed 
the anomalous conditions observable in the captured traffic signals. Other parameters 
Multiple of Standard Deviation 3σ 4σ 3σ 4σ
Received Traffic Signal (Bytes) 0.0194 0.0259 0.0315 0.0420
Sent Traffic Signal (Bytes) 0.0193 0.0257 0.0312 0.0416
Received Traffic Signal (Packets) 2.2668 3.0225 3.0583 4.0777
Sent Traffic Signal (Packets) 1.7335 2.3113 2.7241 3.6322





were held constant throughout the processing and detection phases. The parameter values 
used are shown in Table 2.  











Each captured traffic signal was decomposed with the Daubechies-1 wavelet and 
reconstructed at six levels. The reconstructed signals were then compared with the 
threshold values for anomaly detection in accordance with the flowchart presented in 
Figure 10. The associated false positives and false negatives for different wavelet 
window sizes Nx, detection window sizes Nd, and threshold values γlev used in the data 
processing and anomaly detection phases of the detection scheme are displayed in Tables 
3–5. For each case, the number of false positives and false negatives are annotated in the 
columns labeled P and N, respectively. The false positives and false negatives were 
determined based on observable anomalous conditions in the previously presented traffic 
signals. If an anomaly was reported for an interval in the captured traffic signals that 
appeared normal, it was labeled as a false positive. If a clearly observable anomalous 
condition for the captured traffic signals was not reported by the detection method, it was 
labeled as a false negative.  
 47 
Table 3.   MITM Attack Detection Results for Varied Parameter Values 
 
 
Table 4.   DDoS Attack Detection Results for Varied Parameter Values 
 





P N P N P N P N P N P N P N P N P N P N P N P N
Received Bytes 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
Received Packets 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Delay 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
Received Bytes 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
Received Packets 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Delay 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2
Wavelet Window Size (N x )
200 300 600
Detection Window Size (N d ) Detection Window Size (N d ) Detection Window Size (N d )





P N P N P N P N P N P N P N P N P N P N P N P N
Bytes Received 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Packets Received 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Bytes Sent 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
Packets Sent 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
Delay 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Bytes Received 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Packets Received 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Bytes Sent 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
Packets Sent 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0





Wavelet Window Size (N x )
200 300 600
Detection Window Size (N d ) Detection Window Size (N d ) Detection Window Size (N d )
10 25 50 10010 25 50 100
P N P N P N P N P N P N P N P N P N P N P N P N
Received Bytes 0 0 0 1 0 7 0 8 0 1 0 1 0 3 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 7
Received Packets 0 3 0 7 0 11 0 14 0 1 0 3 0 10 0 14 0 2 0 5 0 9 0 11
Sent Bytes 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sent Packets 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Delay 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Received Bytes 0 2 0 6 0 10 0 14 0 1 0 4 0 7 0 14 0 1 0 5 0 9 0 11
Received Packets 0 9 0 10 0 15 0 16 0 7 0 11 0 15 0 16 0 8 0 11 0 13 0 16
Sent Bytes 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sent Packets 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Delay 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Wavelet Window Size (N x )
200 300 600
Detection Window Size (N d ) Detection Window Size (N d ) Detection Window Size (N d )






Based on the results displayed in Tables 3–5, a wavelet window size 300xN = , a 
detection window size 10dN = , and the level threshold value 3levγ σ=  produced the best 
detection results. The false positives and negatives associated with the parameter values 
are highlighted in the tables by the red boxes. The parameter values referenced above 
reduced the total number of observed false positives to one and the total number of 
observed false negatives to two across all of the cyber event traffic signals. The two false 
negatives were observed in the received byte and packet traffic signals of the congestion 
cyber event and represent the same anomalous traffic interval.  
3. Reporting Anomalous Traffic Conditions  
The detected and reported anomalous traffic conditions for the various cyber 
events emulated in the SDN test environment are displayed in Figures 29–35. As stated 
previously, the traffic conditions for all cyber event tests were sampled at one-second 
intervals. The vertical red lines in all the figures represent the beginning and end times of 
the detected anomalies in the analyzed traffic signals. The captured traffic signals and 
their reconstructed detail coefficients at wavelet levels 1–6 are depicted in the figures. 
The anomalous conditions visible in the traffic signals are emphasized at each wavelet 
level by spikes in the detail coefficients. The reported anomalies that met the threshold 
conditions are displayed in the traffic signal and all its reconstructed wavelet levels. The 
levels at which they were detected are not indicated. As evidenced by the results 
highlighted in Tables 3–5, similar anomalies were reported in the byte and packet signals 
using the final parameter values; therefore, the anomalous conditions reported in the 
packet signals of each cyber event are not displayed.   
a. MITM Attack 
The anomalous traffic conditions based on the byte signal for received traffic at 
the attack host 10.10.12.2 during the MITM attack are observed in Figure 29. The 
anomalous traffic conditions based on the delay signal captured at host 10.10.12.1 are 
illustrated in Figure 30.  
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In Figure 29, anomalies were detected and reported at 1,168 to 1,188 seconds and 
2,984 to 3,012 seconds. The first anomaly represents the sharp jump in received traffic as 
the MITM attack was initiated and the attack host 10.10.12.2 started receiving all the 
traffic sent by the target host 10.10.12.1. The second anomaly represents a sharp drop in 
the traffic signal after the attack was ended and the network returned to forwarding traffic 
in accordance with its physical connections. All other traffic in the collected signal 
appears normal and is free of any anomalies. The same anomalies at the beginning and 
end of the MITM attack are observed in the delay signal. There were not any false 
positives or negatives reported by the detection method. 
 
Figure 29.  MITM Attack Detection in Received Byte Signal at Host 10.10.12.2 
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Figure 30.  MITM Attack Detection in Delay Signal at Host 10.10.12.1 
b. DDoS Attack 
The anomalous traffic conditions based on the byte signal for received traffic at 
the target host 10.10.12.1 during the DDoS attack are revealed in Figure 31. The data 
rates rose almost instantaneously as the attack was initiated, and the target host was 
flooded with UDP traffic from the nine attacking hosts. The data rates returned to normal 
when the attack was ended. The beginning and end of the DDoS attack are accurately 
reported by the anomaly detection method in the received byte signal. The anomaly 
intervals reported in the received byte signal are at 1,200 to 1,230 seconds and 1,806 to 
1,846 seconds. One false positive is reported in the received byte signal of Figure 31 at 
1,385 to 1,410 seconds. The false positive is not a major concern because it occurs during 
the DDoS attack; therefore, it does not indicate a separate attack. As evidenced by the 
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results highlighted in Table 4, the false positive was not reported in the packet signal for 
received traffic. There were no false negatives reported.  
 
Figure 31.  DDoS Attack Detection in Received Byte Signal at Host 10.10.12.1 
The anomalous traffic conditions based on the byte signal for traffic sent by the 
target host of the attack are revealed in Figure 32. The target host experienced degraded 
communication with its intended recipient 10.10.14.1 due to the DDoS attack during the 
interval from 1,658 to 1,836 seconds. The anomalous conditions are clearly visible in the 
traffic signals and are accurately reported by the detection method. The detection method 
did not report any false positives or negatives in the captured sent traffic signal. 
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Figure 32.  DDoS Attack Detection in Sent Byte Signal at Host 10.10.12.1 
The anomalous traffic conditions based on the delay signal between the target 
host 10.10.12.1 and its intended recipient 10.10.14.1 are revealed in Figure 33. The 
detection method reported a single anomaly during the time interval from 1,412 to 1,640 
seconds. This anomaly is consistent with the anomalous conditions reported in the other 
traffic signals. There were no false positives or negatives reported.  
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Figure 33.  DDoS Attack Detection in Delay Signal at Host 10.10.12.1 
c. Congestion 
The anomalous traffic conditions observable in the received byte signal and delay 
signal collected at host 10.10.12.1 during the congestion cyber event are revealed in 
Figure 34 and Figure 35, respectively. The detection method accurately reported the 
anomalies introduced by congestion in each captured traffic signal. The effects of the 
congestion caused significant degradation in the received data rate and a drastic increase 
in the delay. The sent byte and packet signals collected at host 10.10.12.1 were also 
passed to the data processing and anomaly detection phases of our proposed scheme. 
Validating our initial observations based on the captured signals displayed in Figure 22, 
no anomalous conditions were reported. Since there were not any anomalous conditions 
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reported for the signals, their outputs from the data processing and anomaly detection 
phases are not displayed.  
The detection method failed to detect one anomaly in the received byte signal for 
the congestion cyber event. The false negative is highlighted by the green box in Figure 
34. The same false negative was reported in the received packet signal and is indicated in
Table 5. The false negative is not considered significant because it does not cause the 
overall cyber event to be undetected.  
Figure 34.  Congestion Detection in Received Byte Signal at Host 10.10.12.1 
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Figure 35.  Congestion Detection in Delay Signal at Host 10.10.12.1 
4. Cyber Event Classification Framework 
We classified the cyber events in accordance with the flowchart displayed in 
Figure 11. The classification of the cyber events relied on the reported anomalies for the 
captured traffic signals displayed in Figures 29–35. The presence of reported anomalous 
conditions in the byte and delay signals at the analyzed ports served as the inputs to the 
classification flowchart. Anomalous conditions reported in the packet signals were not 
considered due to their mirroring of anomalous conditions reported in the byte signals. 
The individual paths through the classification flowchart for the anomalous conditions 
reported from each cyber event are displayed in Figure 36.  
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Figure 36.  Cyber Event Classification 
The MITM attack produced detectable anomalies in the delay signal at the switch 
port of the target host 10.10.12.1 and the received byte signal at the switch port of the 
attack host 10.10.12.2. Classification of the MITM attack was reliant on the detection of 
anomalous conditions at both switch ports. The presence of reported anomalies in the 
delay signal but not the received or sent byte signals at the target host port led to a 
conditional classification of the MITM attack. The path through the flowchart in Figure 
36 based on reported anomalies at the target host port is highlighted by the purple arrows. 
The presence of reported anomalies in the received byte signal but not the delay signal at 
the attack host port confirmed the classification of the MITM attack. The path through 
the flowchart based on the anomalies reported at the attack host port is highlighted by the 
blue arrows.  
Unlike the MITM attack, reported anomalous conditions at a single switch port 
were capable of classifying the DDoS attack and network congestion. The DDoS attack 
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produced detectable anomalies in the received byte signal, the sent byte signal, and the 
delay signal at the switch port for the target host 10.10.12.1. These conditions led to the 
classification of the DDoS attack by following the red arrows in Figure 36. Congestion 
produced detectable anomalies in the received byte signal and the delay signal at the 
switch port of host 10.10.12.1. Anomalies were not detectable in the sent byte signal of 
host 10.10.12.1, thereby enabling it to be differentiated from the DDoS attack. The path 
for classification of the congestion cyber event is represented by the green arrows in 
Figure 36.  
5. Limitations 
Application of the detection scheme validated by the results in this chapter has 
several key limitations related to scalability and information availability. While the 
controller is capable of monitoring all switch ports in the data plane to obtain the 
necessary byte and packet signals for the detection scheme, such a task may become 
untenable in a large network. Additionally, analyzing collected traffic signals for each 
switch port is computationally intensive. To mitigate the scalability limitations, the 
detection scheme could be employed selectively to switch ports determined to be 
particularly vulnerable to the cyber events considered. Further mitigations include 
variable port monitoring and adjustment of the sampling period.  
Anomalous conditions reported in the captured delay signals were shown to be 
critical components of the classification logic. Without knowledge of the anomalous 
conditions in the delay signals, the cyber events are still detectable based on the byte and 
packet signal anomalies, but they are unable to be differentiated from each other within 
our classification framework. Collection of accurate delay data is a complex task. In this 
thesis, we collected delay data using the SPP application. Yet, this data had to be 
collected between two communicating hosts in the data plane; therefore, the controller 
had access to the byte and packet signals but not the delay signal. For application of our 
detection scheme at the controller, the anomalous conditions reported by the delay signals 
collected from hosts in the data plane would have to be transferred to the controller. This 
could be facilitated by the addition of a dedicated server at each data plane switch 
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responsible for receiving the delay signals, analyzing them for anomalous conditions, and 
transporting the reported information to the controller. The architecture would resemble 
that proposed by Ryu for the integration of Snort [24].  
In this chapter, we presented the network test environment used to observe and 
collect traffic for the various cyber events considered, detailed our methods for emulating 
the cyber events, and validated our proposed scheme for anomaly detection and 
classification. Using wavelets to process the traffic signals for the various cyber events 
enabled us to clearly expose the anomalous conditions for presentation to our detection 
method. The multiple threshold values established through statistical analysis of normal 
traffic conditions enabled us to accurately report the anomalies and their associated time 
intervals. Unique anomalous conditions for the each cyber event enabled us to classify 
them. Overall, our anomaly detection and classification scheme was validated and shown 
to produce limited numbers of false positives and negatives. For development of the 
detection scheme into a deployable application, the limitations presented in this chapter 




In this thesis, we used a wavelet-based detection scheme to successfully reveal 
anomalous conditions associated with an SDN specific MITM attack, a DDoS attack, and 
network congestion. Furthermore, we demonstrated that these cyber events generate 
unique anomalies enabling them to be differentiated and accurately classified.  
A. SUMMARY OF RESULTS 
The detection scheme employed in this thesis focused on revealing anomalous 
conditions associated with the emulated cyber events in the byte, packet, and delay traffic 
signals at the network layer. For each emulated cyber event, we were able to successfully 
collect traffic signals for byte and packet data at specified switch ports from the controller 
and delay data from hosts in the data plane. The collected traffic signals clearly exposed 
observable indicators of anomalous conditions introduced by the various cyber events. 
Such observable indictors validated our use of information at the network layer for 
anomaly detection.   
Processing the captured traffic signals with the Daubechies-1 wavelet, we 
observed and detected periods of anomalous conditions at various wavelet levels. Our 
detection method experienced a limited number of false positives and negatives. The 
false positives and negatives were reduced by tuning the detection method for optimal 
window sizes and threshold values. The false negatives were experienced during 
detection of the network congestion. They did not hinder overall detection and 
classification of the network congestion cyber event. The importance of selecting the 
proper wavelet and detection window sizes for exposure of particular anomalies was 
emphasized in [8]. This was further evidenced in this thesis by varying the window size 
parameters.  
The last phase of our detection scheme involved classification of the introduced 
cyber events. We presented a logic based flowchart to successfully classify the cyber 
events based on localization of the reported anomalies in the collected traffic signals. 
Each cyber event produced anomalous conditions at different ports and traffic signals. 
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The unique anomalous conditions reported by the detection scheme facilitated our 
development of the logic based classification flowchart.    
Overall, we successfully satisfied our stated objectives. We presented and 
validated an alternate method for detection of the SDN MITM proposed by [4]. We 
showed that the introduction of the MITM attack diverges from normal traffic conditions 
and is, therefore, detectable with wavelet analysis. Furthermore, the reported anomalies 
associated with the attack were differentiable from other well-known cyber events 
detected with the scheme. By collecting and analyzing signals that were representative of 
traffic on the wire, we added an additional layer of defense against attackers seeking to 
hide. Further development of our proposed detection scheme into a deployable 
application is the next step to facilitate the mitigation of risks associated with SDN 
adoption. Such a reduction in risks is a critical requirement for the deployment of SDN in 
the military communications environment.   
The major contributions of this thesis are represented by the methods for detection 
and classification of the MITM attack. To the best of our knowledge, a wavelet-based 
anomaly detection scheme has not been used in previous research to expose a MITM 
attack. Additionally, the classification of a MITM attack based on its generated traffic 
signals at the network layer has not been previously explored.  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
The primary method employed for initial detection of anomalous conditions in the 
reconstructed wavelet signals was based on a comparison of the calculated mean absolute 
deviation of samples in a detection window with their associated threshold value γlev. The 
threshold values γlev were established using statistical analysis of normal traffic 
conditions at the host ports of the switches. While this method was shown to be 
acceptable, it is recommended that alternate methods for threshold determination be 
explored and compared with the method used in this research. One such alternate method 
involves clustering techniques [21].    
The traffic generated on the network represented UDP streams at a constant data 
rate. This is not reflective of the self-similar nature of Ethernet traffic. It is recommended 
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that more realistic traffic collected from a live local area network be introduced to the 
SDN environment for further validation of the detection scheme.  
The complexities surrounding the collection of delay data introduce a primary 
shortfall of the detection scheme with regard to live deployment. Anomalous conditions 
exposed in the delay signals are required for accurate classification of the MITM attack 
and the other cyber events introduced. While the delay signals were collected using the 
SPP tool at the network hosts, we recommend that alternate methods be explored. 
Additionally, a method for transferring the delay signals to the controller is required for 
integration of the detection scheme into a single application.   
In this thesis, the SDN MITM attack proposed by [4] was recreated in our 
physical SDN environment, detected, and classified. While the primary goal was to 
present an alternate detection method that would prevent the attackers from hiding, we 
were unable test the detection method under such a scenario. It is recommended that the 
attack be introduced with efforts for concealment in order to further validate the 
robustness of the detection scheme.  
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APPENDIX A.  MITM ATTACK CODE 
The key elements required to implement the MITM attack within the SDN 
environment consisted of the relay tunnels for the LLDP packets and the target host 
traffic. The relay tunnels were established between the attack hosts using the VTun 
protocol. The configuration files for the relay tunnels were built using the examples 
provided on the VTun website [27]. To relay the LLDP packets between the attack hosts, 
Daemonlogger was integrated into the VTun configuration files. The method for 
integration of Daemonlogger into the VTun configuration files was introduced by 
Strandboge [28]. Examples of the VTun configuration files for establishment of an LLDP 
relay tunnel between attack hosts 10.10.12.2 and 10.10.14.2 are displayed below. In these 
examples, attack host 10.10.12.2 is the server for the tunnel, and attack host 10.10.14.2 is 
the client. Daemonlogger is used at the attack host 10.10.12.2 to capture the LLDP 
packets from its physical interface eth0 and transfer them to its virtual tunnel interface 
tap0. At the attack host 10.10.14.2, Daemonlogger is used to capture the received LLDP 
packets at its virtual tunnel interface tap0 and transfer them to its physical interface eth0.  
The other tunnels for relaying LLDP packets from attack host 10.10.14.2 to attack 
host 10.10.12.2 and redirection of target host traffic were setup with similar configuration 
files. The configuration files for the target traffic relay tunnel did not include 
Daemonlogger. Linux bridges were used instead of Daemonlogger to transfer target host 
traffic to the target traffic relay tunnel. An example of the bridge configuration at the 
attack host 10.10.12.2 is also displayed below. The bridge configuration example is based 




# Configuration file at attack host 10.10.12.2 to relay LLDP packets to 
# attack host 10.10.14.2 
 







# Setup the log file for tunnel statistics  
syslog     daemon; 
 
# Define paths to required programs 




# Define the default options 
default { 
compress no;   # Do not use compression 




# Define the tunnel session 
Attack_tunnel_1 { 
passwd  Password1;   # Set the tunnel password 
type ether;         # Define the tunnel type 
proto udp;           # Define the tunnel protocol 
compress no;        # Turn compression off 
encrypt no;         # Turn tunnel encryption off 
stat no;            # Turn statistics logging off 
keepalive yes;       # Ensure the tunnel maintains its connection 
device tap0;         # Define the virtual interface of the tunnel 
 
# Setup the tunnel connection 
up { 
 
# Establish the IP address for the virtual interface 
ifconfig "%% 192.168.2.1 netmask 255.255.255.0"; 
 
# Instruct Daemonlogger to capture LLDP packets at the 
# physical interface eth0 and send them to the virtual tunnel 
# interface tap0 
program /usr/bin/daemonlogger "-f /etc/bpf.conf -i eth0 -o tap0"; 
   }; 
 
# Remove the tunnel interfaces and kill the Daemonlogger application 
# when the tunnel session is closed 
down { 
 
# Delete the virtual tunnel interface tap0 
ifconfig "tap0 down"; 
program /bin/ip "link delete tap0"; 
 
# Kill the Daemonlogger application 
program /usr/bin/pkill "-f -x '/usr/bin/daemonlogger -f 
/etc/bpf.conf -i eth0 -o tap0'"; 
 
# Ensure all VTun sessions are closed  
program /usr/bin/pkill "vtund"; 
    }; 
} 
# To start VTun server session from terminal:  
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# vtund –n –f /etc/vtund-server.conf –s 
 
# Create bpf.conf file in /etc directory to tell Daemonlogger to only  
# forward LLDP packets received from the switch connected to attack  
# host 10.10.12.2 through the LLDP relay tunnel: 
 
# ether proto 0x88cc && 






# Configuration file at attack host 10.10.14.2 to receive LLDP packets 




passwd  Password1;  # Set the tunnel password 
type ether;        # Define the tunnel type 
device tap0;        # Define the virtual interface of the tunnel 
 
   # Setup the tunnel connection 
   up { 
 
   # Establish the IP address for the virtual interface  
   ifconfig "%% 192.168.2.2 netmask 255.255.255.0"; 
 
   # Instruct Daemonlogger to capture received LLDP packets at the 
   # virtual interface tap0 and send them to the physical interface 
   # eth0 
 
   program /usr/bin/daemonlogger "-f /etc/bpf2.conf -i tap0 –o   
        eth0"; 
   }; 
 
   # Remove the tunnel interfaces and kill the Daemonlogger application 
   # when the tunnel session is closed 
    
   down { 
 
   # Delete the virtual tunnel interface tap0 
   ifconfig "tap0 down"; 
   program /bin/ip "link delete tap0"; 
    
   # Kill the Daemonlogger application 
   program /usr/bin/pkill "-f -x '/usr/bin/daemonlogger –f       
           /etc/bpf2.conf -i tap0 -o eth1'"; 
   }; 
} 
# To start VTund client session from terminal:  
# vtund -n -f /etc/vtund-client.conf Attack_tunnel_1 10.10.12.2  
 
 
# Create bpf2.conf file in /etc directory to tell Daemonlogger to only  
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# forward LLDP packets to the eth0 interface: 






# Linux bridge to transfer traffic from target host 10.10.12.1 to  








# Set the virtual interface for the bridge 
tap_int="tap2" 
 




# Setup the bridge 
brctl addbr $bridge_int 
 
brctl addif $bridge_int $ethernet_int $tap_int 
ifconfig $bridge_int $bridge_ip up 
# Specify the bridge forwarding policies to only relay traffic from  
# target host 10.10.12.1 
 
ebtables -t broute -A BROUTING -p ipv4 -i eth0 --ip-dst 10.10.12.2 -j 
DROP 
ebtables -t broute -A BROUTING -p arp -i eth0 -d d4:be:d9:8e:60:a2 -j 
DROP 





APPENDIX B.  MATLAB DETECTION SCHEME CODE 
The primary MATLAB code sections for implementation of the anomaly 
detection scheme presented in Chapter III are displayed below. The separate code 
sections are labeled numerically. The first code section was used to establish the port 
specific threshold values γlev for anomaly detection. The second code section is an 
example implementation of the data processing and anomaly detection phases of the 
presented scheme. The example represents data processing and anomaly detection for the 
MITM attack traffic signals. The MATLAB code sections for data processing and 
anomaly detection of the DDoS attack and network congestion traffic signals only differ 
by data inputs and variable names; therefore, the specific code sections are not displayed. 
The functions for wavelet analysis used in the presented code sections are based on the 
examples presented in [17]. The code segments for the general implementation of 





% Theshold assignment for anomaly detection based on normal traffic  
% signals 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
% Import and cleanup normal traffic data 
port_data = csvread('PortStats_1_Port2_Norm_05_24.csv', 1); 
delay_data = csvread('N_Delay_05_24.csv'); 
sim_time = 7400; 
  
[~, ~, ~, ~, P2_Bytes_Received, P2_Packets_Received, P2_Bytes_Sent,... 
P2_Packets_Sent, P4_Bytes_Received, P4_Packets_Received, 
P4_Bytes_Sent,... 
P4_Packets_Sent,sized_delay_data] = CleanData(port_data, delay_data,... 
sim_time); 
  
% Limit data to 3,600 samples 
P2_Bytes_Received = P2_Bytes_Received(end-3599:end,1); 
P2_Packets_Received = P2_Packets_Received(end-3599:end,1); 
  
P2_Bytes_Sent = P2_Bytes_Sent(end-3599:end,1); 
P2_Packets_Sent = P2_Packets_Sent(end-3599:end,1); 
  
P4_Bytes_Received = P4_Bytes_Received(end-3599:end,1); 
P4_Packets_Received = P4_Packets_Received(end-3599:end,1); 
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P4_Bytes_Sent = P4_Bytes_Sent(end-3599:end,1); 
P4_Packets_Sent = P4_Packets_Sent(end-3599:end,1); 
  
sized_delay_data = sized_delay_data(end-3599:end,1); 
  
analysis_time = 3600; 
  
% Convert Byte Data to Mbps 
  
P2_Bytes_Received = P2_Bytes_Received*8/10^6; 
P2_Bytes_Sent = P2_Bytes_Sent*8/10^6; 
  
P4_Bytes_Received = P4_Bytes_Received*8/10^6; 
P4_Bytes_Sent = P4_Bytes_Sent*8/10^6; 
  
% Convert Delay Data to ms 
  
sized_delay_data = sized_delay_data*10^3; 
  
%% Wavelet analysis of normal traffic data 
  
wavelet = 'db1'; 
levels = 6; 
  
% Port 2: received bytes signal 
  
wave_data = P2_Bytes_Received; 
  
[A_P2_Bytes_Received, D_P2_Bytes_Received, s_P2_Bytes_Received] =... 
WaveletAnalysisNorm(wavelet, levels, wave_data); 
  
% Port 2: sent bytes signal 
  
wave_data = P2_Bytes_Sent; 
  
[A_P2_Bytes_Sent, D_P2_Bytes_Sent, s_P2_Bytes_Sent] =... 
WaveletAnalysisNorm(wavelet, levels, wave_data); 
  
% Port 4: received bytes signal 
  
wave_data = P4_Bytes_Received; 
  
[A_P4_Bytes_Received, D_P4_Bytes_Received, s_P4_Bytes_Received] =... 
WaveletAnalysisNorm(wavelet, levels, wave_data); 
  
% Port 4: sent bytes signal 
  
wave_data = P4_Bytes_Sent; 
  
[A_P4_Bytes_Sent, D_P4_Bytes_Sent, s_P4_Bytes_Sent] =... 
WaveletAnalysisNorm(wavelet, levels, wave_data); 
  
% Port 2: received packets signal 
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wave_data = P2_Packets_Received; 
  
[A_P2_Packets_Received, D_P2_Packets_Received, s_P2_Packets_Received] = 
WaveletAnalysisNorm(wavelet, levels, wave_data); 
  
% Port 2: sent packets signal 
  
wave_data = P2_Packets_Sent; 
  
[A_P2_Packets_Sent, D_P2_Packets_Sent, s_P2_Packets_Sent] = 
WaveletAnalysisNorm(wavelet, levels, wave_data); 
  
% Port 4: received packets signal 
  
wave_data = P4_Packets_Received; 
  
[A_P4_Packets_Received, D_P4_Packets_Received, s_P4_Packets_Received] = 
WaveletAnalysisNorm(wavelet, levels, wave_data); 
  
% Port 4: sent packets signal 
  
wave_data = P4_Packets_Sent; 
  




% Port 4: delay signal 
  
wave_data = sized_delay_data; 
[A_P4_Delay, D_P4_Delay, s_P4_Delay]... 
= WaveletAnalysisNorm(wavelet, levels, wave_data); 
  
%% Assign Threshold Values (γlev) 
  
% Multiple of standard deviation 
  
threshold_level = 3; 
  
% Threshold values: Port 2 - host 10.10.12.2 
  
D_P2_Bytes_Received_reconstructed = D_P2_Bytes_Received(1,:)+ 
D_P2_Bytes_Received(2,:) + D_P2_Bytes_Received(3,:) +... 






D_P2_Bytes_Sent_reconstructed = D_P2_Bytes_Sent(1,:)+ 
D_P2_Bytes_Sent(2,:) + D_P2_Bytes_Sent(3,:) +... 






D_P2_Packets_Received_reconstructed = D_P2_Packets_Received(1,:)+ 
D_P2_Packets_Received(2,:) + D_P2_Packets_Received(3,:) +... 






D_P2_Packets_Sent_reconstructed = D_P2_Packets_Sent(1,:)+ 
D_P2_Packets_Sent(2,:) + D_P2_Packets_Sent(3,:) +... 






% Threshold values: Port 4 - host 10.10.12.1 
  
D_P4_Bytes_Received_reconstructed = D_P4_Bytes_Received(1,:)+ 
D_P4_Bytes_Received(2,:) + D_P4_Bytes_Received(3,:) +... 






D_P4_Bytes_Sent_reconstructed = D_P4_Bytes_Sent(1,:)+ 
D_P4_Bytes_Sent(2,:) + D_P4_Bytes_Sent(3,:) +... 





D_P4_Packets_Received_reconstructed = D_P4_Packets_Received(1,:)+ 
D_P4_Packets_Received(2,:) + D_P4_Packets_Received(3,:) +... 






D_P4_Packets_Sent_reconstructed = D_P4_Packets_Sent(1,:)+ 
D_P4_Packets_Sent(2,:) + D_P4_Packets_Sent(3,:) +... 






D_P4_Delay_reconstructed = D_P4_Delay(1,:)+ D_P4_Delay(2,:) + 
D_P4_Delay(3,:) +... 
D_P4_Delay(4,:) + D_P4_Delay(5,:) + D_P4_Delay(6,:); 
  





%% Wavelet analysis function for threshold assignment  
%  Based on examples from [17] 
  
function [A, D, s_D] = WaveletAnalysisNorm(wavelet,...  
levels, wave_data) 
  
% Initialize outputs 
  
s_D = zeros(1,6); 
  
% Obtain wavelet coefficients 
  
[Coeff, P] = wavedec(wave_data, levels, wavelet); 
         
for k = 1:levels 
    A(k,:) = wrcoef('a', Coeff, P, wavelet, k); 
    D(k,:) = wrcoef('d', Coeff, P, wavelet, k); 








% Wavelet analysis and detection for the MITM attack 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
% Import and cleanup data 
  
port_data = csvread('PortStats_1_Port2_Fresh_05_28.csv', 1); 
delay_data = csvread('LLDP_Fresh_05_28.csv'); 
sim_time = 4800; 
  
[~, ~, ~, ~, P2_Bytes_Received, P2_Packets_Received, P2_Bytes_Sent,... 
~, ~, ~, ~, ~, sized_delay_data] = CleanData(port_data, delay_data,... 
sim_time); 
  
% Limit data to 3,600 samples 
  
P2_Bytes_Received = P2_Bytes_Received(end-3600:end-1); 
P2_Packets_Received = P2_Packets_Received(end-3600:end-1); 
sized_delay_data = sized_delay_data(end-3600:end-1); 
  
% Convert byte data to Mbps 
  
P2_Bytes_Received = P2_Bytes_Received*8/10^6; 
  
% Convert delay data to ms 
  
sized_delay_data = sized_delay_data*10^3; 
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analysis_time = length(P2_Bytes_Received); 
  
%% Man-in-the-Middle Attack Analysis 
  
% Define wavelet and detection parameters 
  
wavelet = 'db1'; 
levels = 6;     
window = 300;  % Nx 
det_window = 10;  % Nd 
level_threshold = 4; % γrep 
det_type = 1; 
backoff = 0.2*window; % Pb 
overlap = 0.1*window; % v 
  
% Conduct sliding window wavelet analysis and attack detection 
  
for flag = 1:3; 
  
    % Port 2: wavelet analysis and anomaly detection in received byte 
    % signal 
     
    if flag == 1; 
         
        attack_interval_Bytes = []; 
        attack_interval_Bytes_transformed = []; 
        attack_interval_Bytes_final = []; 
         
        D_P2_Bytes_Received_Trace = zeros(6, analysis_time); 
         
        % Sliding window intervals 
         
        for u = 0:window-overlap:length(P2_Bytes_Received) - overlap; 
             
            interval_Bytes = []; 
            new_interval_Bytes = []; 
            attack_interval = 0; 
             
            % Define window start positions 
             
            if length(P2_Bytes_Received(u+1:end)) < window; 
                wave_data = P2_Bytes_Received(end-window+1:end); 
                start = numel(P2_Bytes_Received(1:end-window)); 
            else; 
                wave_data = P2_Bytes_Received(u+1:u+window); 
                start = u; 
            end 
             
            threshold = Threshold_P2_Bytes_Received; % γlev 
  
            % wavelet analysis and anomaly detection within specified 
            % wavelet window 
             
            [D_P2_Bytes_Received, attack_log_1,... 
            attack_log_2, attack_log_3, attack_log_4, attack_log_5,... 
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            attack_log_6] = WaveletAnalysis_Det(wavelet, levels, ...  
            window, wave_data, threshold, det_window, det_type, start); 
         
            if length(P2_Bytes_Received(u+1:end)) < window; 
                D_P2_Bytes_Received_Trace(:,end-window+1:end) =... 
                D_P2_Bytes_Received; 
            else; 
                D_P2_Bytes_Received_Trace(:,u+1:u+window) =... 
                D_P2_Bytes_Received; 
            end 
             
            % Initial anomolies reported at each wavelet level based on 
            % threshold value (γlev) 
             
            attack_log_data = [attack_log_1 attack_log_2...  
            attack_log_3 attack_log_4, attack_log_5, attack_log_6]; 
         
            % Find repeating anomalies at multiple levels 
  
            if nnz(attack_log_data) > 0; 
                remove_zeros = find(attack_log_data == 0); 
                attack_log_data(remove_zeros) = [];    
                possible_attack_times = unique(attack_log_data); 
                multiple_level_check = histc(attack_log_data(:),... 
                possible_attack_times); 
             
                % Report repeating anomalies that meet or exceed the 
                % level_threshold value (γrep) 
  
                k = 1; 
                for j = 1:length(multiple_level_check); 
                    if multiple_level_check(j) >= level_threshold; 
                        attack_interval(k) =  possible_attack_times(j); 
                        k = k + 1; 
                    end 
                end 
                 
                % Define the anomalous intervals within the original  
                % signal 
             
                if attack_interval ~= 0; 
                     
                    for l = 1:length(attack_interval); 
                        start_interval = attack_interval(l); 
                        end_interval = attack_interval(l) + det_window; 
  
                        interval_Bytes(l,1) = start_interval; 
                        interval_Bytes(l,2) = end_interval; 
                    end 
                     
                   % Combine overlapping anomalies and report 
       % anomalies within the specified wavelet window 
                     
                    interval_Bytes2 = interval_Bytes; 
                    if numel(interval_Bytes2) > 2; 
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                        for i = 1:length(interval_Bytes2)-1; 
                            if interval_Bytes(i+1,1) -... 
                               interval_Bytes(i,2) <= 0; 
                               interval_Bytes2(i,2) = 0; 
                               interval_Bytes2(i+1,1) = 0; 
                            end 
                        end 
  
                        for i = 1:length(interval_Bytes2); 
                            new_interval_Bytes = [new_interval_Bytes... 
                            interval_Bytes2(i,:)]; 
                        end 
  
                        discard_values = find(new_interval_Bytes == 0); 
                        new_interval_Bytes(discard_values) = []; 
  
                        attack_interval_Bytes =... 
     [attack_interval_Bytes new_interval_Bytes]; 
                    else 
                        attack_interval_Bytes =...  
                        [attack_interval_Bytes interval_Bytes2]; 
                    end 
           
                end 
            end 
        end 
         
        % Combine anomalies not separated by the specified back-off   
        % period and report final anomalous intervals in the analyzed  
        % signal 
     
        for i = 1:2:length(attack_interval_Bytes); 
            attack_interval_Bytes_transformed =... 
            vertcat(attack_interval_Bytes_transformed,... 
            attack_interval_Bytes(i:i+1)); 
        end 
  
        if numel(attack_interval_Bytes_transformed) > 2; 
            attack_interval_Bytes_transformed =... 
            sortrows(attack_interval_Bytes_transformed); 
            for i = 1:length(attack_interval_Bytes_transformed)-1; 
                if attack_interval_Bytes_transformed(i+1,2) -... 
                    attack_interval_Bytes_transformed(i,2) <= 0; 
                    attack_interval_Bytes_transformed(i+1,2) =... 
                    attack_interval_Bytes_transformed(i,2); 
                end                
            end 
             
            for i = 1:length(attack_interval_Bytes_transformed)-1; 
                if attack_interval_Bytes_transformed(i+1,1) -... 
                    attack_interval_Bytes_transformed(i,2) <= backoff; 
                    attack_interval_Bytes_transformed(i,2) = 0; 
                    attack_interval_Bytes_transformed(i+1,1) =0; 
                end 




            for i = 1:length(attack_interval_Bytes_transformed); 
                attack_interval_Bytes_final =... 
                [attack_interval_Bytes_final... 
                attack_interval_Bytes_transformed(i,:)]; 
            end 
  
            discard_values = find(attack_interval_Bytes_final == 0); 
            attack_interval_Bytes_final(discard_values) = []; 
             
        else; 
            attack_interval_Bytes_final =...  
            attack_interval_Bytes_transformed; 
        end 
    end 
     
    % Port 2: wavelet analysis and anomaly detection in received packet 
    % signal 
     
    if flag == 2; 
         
        attack_interval_Packets = []; 
        attack_interval_Packets_transformed = []; 
        attack_interval_Packets_final = []; 
         
        D_P2_Packets_Received_Trace = zeros(6, analysis_time); 
         
        % Sliding window intervals 
         
        for u = 0:window-overlap:length(P2_Packets_Received) - overlap; 
            interval_Packets = []; 
            new_interval_Packets = []; 
            attack_interval = 0; 
            
            % Define window start positions 
             
            if length(P2_Packets_Received(u+1:end)) < window; 
                wave_data = P2_Packets_Received(end-window+1:end); 
                start = numel(P2_Packets_Received(1:end-window)); 
            else; 
                wave_data = P2_Packets_Received(u+1:u+window); 
                start = u; 
            end 
             
            threshold = Threshold_P2_Packets_Received; % γlev 
             
            % wavelet analysis and anomaly detection within specified 
            % wavelet window 
             
            [D_P2_Packets_Received, attack_log_1,... 
            attack_log_2, attack_log_3, attack_log_4,...  
            attack_log_5, attack_log_6] =... 
            WaveletAnalysis_Det(wavelet, levels, window,... 
            wave_data, threshold, det_window, det_type, start); 
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            if length(P2_Packets_Received(u+1:end)) < window; 
                D_P2_Packets_Received_Trace(:,end-window+1:end) =... 
                D_P2_Packets_Received; 
            else; 
                D_P2_Packets_Received_Trace(:,u+1:u+window) =... 
                D_P2_Packets_Received; 
            end 
  
            % Initial anomalies reported at each wavelet level based on 
            % threshold value (γlev) 
             
            attack_log_data = [attack_log_1... 
            attack_log_2 attack_log_3... 
            attack_log_4, attack_log_5, attack_log_6]; 
         
            % Find repeating anomalies at multiple levels 
  
            if nnz(attack_log_data) > 0; 
                 
                remove_zeros = find(attack_log_data == 0); 
                attack_log_data(remove_zeros) = [];   
                 
                possible_attack_times = unique(attack_log_data); 
                multiple_level_check = histc(attack_log_data(:),... 
                possible_attack_times); 
                 
                % Report repeating anomalies that meet or exceed the 
                % level_threshold value (γrep) 
  
                k = 1; 
                for j = 1:length(multiple_level_check); 
                    if multiple_level_check(j) >= level_threshold; 
                        attack_interval(k) =  possible_attack_times(j); 
                        k = k + 1; 
                    end 
                end 
  
                % Define the anomalous intervals within the original  
                % signal 
                 
                if attack_interval ~= 0; 
                    for l = 1:length(attack_interval); 
                        start_interval = attack_interval(l); 
                        end_interval = attack_interval(l) + det_window; 
  
                        interval_Packets(l,1) = start_interval; 
                        interval_Packets(l,2) = end_interval; 
                    end 
                end 
  
                % Combine overlapping anomalies and report anomalies  
                % within the specified wavelet window  
                 
                interval_Packets2 = interval_Packets; 
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                if numel(interval_Packets2) > 2; 
                    for i = 1:length(interval_Packets2)-1; 
                        if interval_Packets(i+1,1) -... 
                           interval_Packets(i,2) <= 0; 
                           interval_Packets2(i,2) = 0; 
                           interval_Packets2(i+1,1) = 0; 
                        end 
                    end 
  
                    for i = 1:length(interval_Packets2); 
                        new_interval_Packets =... 
                        [new_interval_Packets interval_Packets2(i,:)]; 
                    end 
  
                    discard_values = find(new_interval_Packets == 0); 
                    new_interval_Packets(discard_values) = []; 
  
                    attack_interval_Packets =...  
                    [attack_interval_Packets new_interval_Packets]; 
                else 
                    attack_interval_Packets =...  
                    [attack_interval_Packets interval_Packets2]; 
                end 
            end 
        end 
         
        % Combine anomalies not separated by the specified back-off  
        % period and report final anomalous intervals in the analyzed  
        % signal 
     
        for i = 1:2:length(attack_interval_Packets); 
            attack_interval_Packets_transformed =... 
            vertcat(attack_interval_Packets_transformed,... 
            attack_interval_Packets(i:i+1)); 
        end 
         
        if numel(attack_interval_Packets_transformed) > 2; 
            attack_interval_Packets_transformed =... 
            sortrows(attack_interval_Packets_transformed); 
            for i = 1:length(attack_interval_Packets_transformed)-1; 
                if attack_interval_Packets_transformed(i+1,2) -... 
                   attack_interval_Packets_transformed(i,2) <= 0; 
                   attack_interval_Packets_transformed(i+1,2) =... 
                   attack_interval_Packets_transformed(i,2); 
                end                
            end 
             
            for i = 1:length(attack_interval_Packets_transformed)-1; 
                if attack_interval_Packets_transformed(i+1,1) -... 
                    attack_interval_Packets_transformed(i,2)<=backoff; 
                    attack_interval_Packets_transformed(i,2) = 0; 
                    attack_interval_Packets_transformed(i+1,1) =0; 
                end 
            end 
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            for i = 1:length(attack_interval_Packets_transformed); 
                attack_interval_Packets_final =... 
                [attack_interval_Packets_final... 
                 attack_interval_Packets_transformed(i,:)]; 
            end 
  
            discard_values = find(attack_interval_Packets_final == 0); 
            attack_interval_Packets_final(discard_values) = []; 
             
        else; 
            attack_interval_Packets_final =... 
            attack_interval_Packets_transformed; 
        end 
    end 
  
    % Port 4: wavelet analysis and anomaly detection in delay signal 
  
    if flag == 3; 
         
        attack_interval_Delay = []; 
        attack_interval_Delay_transformed = []; 
        attack_interval_Delay_final = []; 
         
        D_P4_Delay_Trace = zeros(6, analysis_time); 
         
        % Sliding window intervals 
         
        for u = 0:window-overlap:length(sized_delay_data) - overlap; 
             
            interval_Delay = []; 
            new_interval_Delay = []; 
            attack_interval = 0; 
             
            % Define window start positions 
             
            if length(sized_delay_data(u+1:end)) < window; 
                wave_data = sized_delay_data(end-window+1:end); 
                start = numel(sized_delay_data(1:end-window)); 
            else; 
                wave_data = sized_delay_data(u+1:u+window); 
                start = u; 
            end 
             
            threshold = Threshold_P4_Delay; % γlev 
             
            % wavelet analysis and anomaly detection 
  
            [D_P4_Delay, attack_log_1,... 
            attack_log_2, attack_log_3, attack_log_4, attack_log_5,... 
            attack_log_6] =... 
            WaveletAnalysis_Det(wavelet, levels, window,... 
            wave_data, threshold, det_window, det_type, start); 
         
            if length(sized_delay_data(u+1:end)) < window; 
                D_P4_Delay_Trace(:,end-window+1:end) = D_P4_Delay; 
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            else; 
                D_P4_Delay_Trace(:,u+1:u+window) = D_P4_Delay; 
            end 
  
            attack_log_data = [attack_log_1 attack_log_2...  
            attack_log_3 attack_log_4, attack_log_5, attack_log_6]; 
         
            % Find repeating anomalies at multiple levels 
  
            if nnz(attack_log_data) > 0; 
                 
                remove_zeros = find(attack_log_data == 0); 
                attack_log_data(remove_zeros) = []; 
                 
                possible_attack_times = unique(attack_log_data); 
                multiple_level_check = histc(attack_log_data(:),... 
                possible_attack_times); 
                 
                % Report repeating anomalies that meet or exceed the 
                % level_threshold value (γrep) 
  
                k = 1; 
                for j = 1:length(multiple_level_check); 
                    if multiple_level_check(j) >= level_threshold; 
                        attack_interval(k) =  possible_attack_times(j); 
                        k = k + 1; 
                    end 
                end 
  
                % Define the anomalous intervals within the original  
                % signal 
                 
                if attack_interval ~= 0; 
                    for l = 1:length(attack_interval); 
                        start_interval = attack_interval(l); 
                        end_interval = attack_interval(l) + det_window; 
  
                        interval_Delay(l,1) = start_interval; 
                        interval_Delay(l,2) = end_interval; 
                    end 
                end 
  
                % Combine overlapping anomalies and report anomalies  
                % within the specified wavelet window 
                 
                interval_Delay2 = interval_Delay; 
                if numel(interval_Delay2) > 2; 
                    for i = 1:length(interval_Delay2)-1; 
                        if interval_Delay(i+1,1) -...  
                        interval_Delay(i,2) <= 0; 
                           interval_Delay2(i,2) = 0; 
                           interval_Delay2(i+1,1) = 0; 
                        end 
                    end 
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                    for i = 1:length(interval_Delay2); 
                        new_interval_Delay = [new_interval_Delay... 
                        interval_Delay2(i,:)]; 
                    end 
  
                    discard_values = find(new_interval_Delay == 0); 
                    new_interval_Delay(discard_values) = []; 
  
                    attack_interval_Delay = [attack_interval_Delay... 
                    new_interval_Delay]; 
                else 
                    attack_interval_Delay = [attack_interval_Delay... 
                    interval_Delay2]; 
                end 
            end 
        end 
     
        % Combine anomalies not separated by the specified back-off  
        % period and report final anomalous intervals in the analyzed  
        % signal 
         
        for i = 1:2:length(attack_interval_Delay); 
            attack_interval_Delay_transformed =... 
            vertcat(attack_interval_Delay_transformed,... 
            attack_interval_Delay(i:i+1)); 
        end 
         
        if numel(attack_interval_Delay_transformed) > 2; 
            attack_interval_Delay_transformed =... 
            sortrows(attack_interval_Delay_transformed); 
            for i = 1:length(attack_interval_Delay_transformed)-1; 
                if attack_interval_Delay_transformed(i+1,2) -... 
                   attack_interval_Delay_transformed(i,2) <= 0; 
                   attack_interval_Delay_transformed(i+1,2) =... 
                   attack_interval_Delay_transformed(i,2); 
                end                
            end 
             
            for i = 1:length(attack_interval_Delay_transformed)-1; 
                if attack_interval_Delay_transformed(i+1,1) -... 
                    attack_interval_Delay_transformed(i,2) <= backoff; 
                    attack_interval_Delay_transformed(i,2) = 0; 
                    attack_interval_Delay_transformed(i+1,1) =0; 
                end 
            end 
  
            for i = 1:length(attack_interval_Delay_transformed); 
                attack_interval_Delay_final =...  
                [attack_interval_Delay_final... 
                attack_interval_Delay_transformed(i,:)]; 
            end 
  
            discard_values = find(attack_interval_Delay_final == 0); 
            attack_interval_Delay_final(discard_values) = []; 
        else 
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            attack_interval_Delay_final =...  
            attack_interval_Delay_transformed; 
        end 





% Wavelet analysis and anomaly detection function 
  
function [D_Trace, attack_log_1, attack_log_2, attack_log_3,... 
attack_log_4, attack_log_5, attack_log_6] = 
WaveletAnalysis_Det(wavelet, levels, window,... 
wave_data, threshold, det_window, det_type, start) 
  
% Initialize outputs 
  
attack_log_1 = 0; 
attack_log_2 = 0; 
attack_log_3 = 0; 
attack_log_4 = 0; 
attack_log_5 = 0; 
attack_log_6 = 0; 
  
m = 1; 
n = 1; 
o = 1; 
p = 1; 
s = 1; 
v = 1; 
  
% Conduct wavelet decomposition 
         
[Coeff, P] = wavedec(wave_data, levels, wavelet); 
  
% Conduct wavelet reconstruction 
  
for k = 1:levels 
    D(k,:) = wrcoef('d', Coeff, P, wavelet, k); 
end 
  
D_Trace = D; 
  
% Anomaly detection with detection window  
  
for l = 1:levels; 
  
    % Detection with mean absolute deviation 
     
    if det_type == 1; 
  
        for q = 0:window - det_window 
  
            mean_window = mad(D(l,q+1:q+det_window)); 
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            if mean_window > threshold; 
                if l == 1; 
                    attack_log_1(m) = start+q+1; 
                    m = m+1; 
                elseif l == 2; 
                    attack_log_2(n) = start+q+1; 
                    n = n+1; 
                elseif l == 3; 
                    attack_log_3(o) = start+q+1; 
                    o = o+1; 
                elseif l ==4; 
                    attack_log_4(p) = start+q+1; 
                    p = p+1; 
                elseif l == 5; 
                    attack_log_5(s) = start+q+1; 
                    s = s+1; 
                else; 
                    attack_log_6(v) = start+q+1; 
                    v = v+1; 
                end 
            end 
        end 
    end 
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